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This thesis presents a three-dimensional approach of visualising and examining the 
phenomenon of nationalism. In this view, nationalism is seen as a modern social 
construction which can be subjected to critical analysis. By identifying the three 
respective dimensions of psychological, political, and discursive of nationalism, it is 
possible to create a framework with which to delve deeper into the concepts, ideas, 
and notions that nationalism portrays, and study the phenomenon in a more holistic 
manner. 
The psychological dimension is the basis for concepts such as identity, ethnicity, and 
culture, which were found to be of key importance to nationalism. By itself, these 
concepts are not enough to constitute as nationalism but require a political 
component to make it so. This is why the political dimension is needed as it provides 
nationalism with such concepts as self-determination, rights, state, and sovereignty. 
In the third, discursive, dimension the ideas stemming from the other two are 
compiled and compressed into a single nationalism that can be presented as a 
narrative to the public arena. 
With the framework the thesis presented, nationalism was found to operate in both 
of the realms of pluralism and monism. As the different sort of nationalisms offer 
people normative notions about living, behaving and thinking, they draw from the 
infinite pool of possible ideas and try to fuse them into a single worldview i.e. 
ideology that is then imposed on to the public. 
With the help of the framework which this thesis argues for, it can now be studied, 
just what sort of a life nationalism wants people to live, and how problematic or 
unproblematic such a life possibly is. 
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Ours is a world of nations, there is no doubt. But its driving force, nationalism, has 
nowadays become a heavily loaded term which can be used in a myriad of ways: as 
a pejorative to something to be enthusiastic about; or as an insult as well as 
compliment. While in reality, nationalism is actually in itself a neutral term, as it is 
essentially nothing more than a socially constructed phenomenon. It is us humans 
that adjoin different meanings to it as well as experience these meanings in the 
pluralist way we do. This is what allows it to be all of the things mentioned above 
while still being none of them. It is also not to be blamed or unrequitedly demonised, 
even if its extremely intricate and complicated nature allows it to be used as an 
instrument of manipulation, crude simplification and bigotry. What must be 
criticised is how nationalism is framed and used by those using it, and not the 
phenomenon itself. Although one can, of course, criticise the reasons for its 
prominence and mishandling. Nevertheless, to demonise the phenomenon without 
understanding its true nature and thus disconnect it from societal and political life 
would equate with missing the mark completely. 
With the current march of right-wing populism that has been thriving for the better 
part of a decade now, at least in a European context, nationalism is seen somewhat 
restrictive. Stemming from these populist movements right-wing nationalists have 
virtually single-handedly appropriated the term for their own usage while media 
has done nothing but aiding them in their task, especially when it comes to dealing 
with the issue of ‘ethno-nationalism’. However, this is only one part of the equation. 
In essence, nationalism as a phenomenon functions as a tool for forming, 
maintaining, and transforming a collective of people that has political goals through 
nationalist argumentation. 
Whether or not you accept that nationalism is on the rise it certainly is not going 
anywhere. We cannot turn a blind eye to the utilisation and manipulation of 
nationalist sentiments, but see them as just one alternative doing politics in a world 
full of other alternatives. Following Özkırımlı, we must be aware that nationalism 
does indeed “matter” as it is the “fundamental organizing principle of the interstate 
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order, as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, as a readily available cognitive 
and discursive frame, as the taken-for-granted context of everyday life” (2010, 2). 
Nationalism by itself amounts to very little as it requires vast amounts of people 
behind it. But if this is achieved, it possesses enormous potential to be used for 
achieving goals were they political, economic or some other by nature. Seen this 
way, nationalism is ultimately a performance and to this performance should the 
critique be directed to, and not only argue that nationalist claims are always and 
inherently wrong. On the contrary, the analyst of nationalism must always go deeper 
than that and this thesis helps doing exactly that by providing a framework and with 
it a set of tools with which to grasp the concepts required in a holistic understanding 
of the phenomenon. 
This is done by employing concept analysis to identify and clarify the most central 
notions and ideas that nationalism and its different dimensions consists of, which in 
turn leads to a more profound understanding of the phenomenon. In the thesis 
certain seemingly familiar concepts close to the phenomenon of nationalism are 
examined. They include but are not limited to ‘culture’, ‘identity’, ‘ethnicity’, 
‘democracy’, and ‘state’. Doing this in a critical manner allows the revelation of 
perspectives that might otherwise get lost in the crowd. This approach is thus 
semiotic by nature as “man [sic] is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun” (Geertz 1973, 5). We, as humans, create the world around us and 
perceive it from that perspective, as humans. 
To clear the convolution surrounding the phenomenon of nationalism the purpose 
of this thesis is to examine the research questions of: 
1. what nationalism is; and 
2. what allows it to be such a varied phenomenon it is. 
This happens by treating nationalism as an analytical category that consists of three 
dimensions with each one having their own concepts, ideas, and notions that 
answer certain questions which the phenomenon tries to solve for its own purposes. 
The term ‘dimension’ is chosen as it makes clear the importance of how a vast 
subject we are dealing with in the first place. The world we inhabit (or at least the 
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way we perceive it) is not one-dimensional, and so neither is nationalism. The 
dimensions are the different angles through which we can examine the phenomenon 
while acknowledging that all these dimensions are required to make up the whole. 
The thesis thus follows Alexander Herzen in his exhortation to reveal the previously 
unseen: 
People love a neat outward appearance. When it comes to truth, they see only 
one striking aspect and do not want to see grass growing round the back. But 
real truths come only in three dimensions, all of which are essential. (cited in 
Kelly 2016, chapter 18; emphasis added) 
To achieve this, this thesis offers a novel framework of (a) visualising, and (b) 
analysing nationalism without the need for unnecessary value-laden qualifications. 
The visualisation part of this framework is formed by treating the phenomenon as 
what it is: an extremely complicated social phenomenon. The complexity is 
concretised by the myriad of definitions that scholars have suggested in their quest 
to exhaustively explain the phenomenon. What this thesis does in connection to this, 
is gather the most prominent of these definitions and treat them as the different 
dimensions of the subject that individually only form a part of the whole and must 
thus be analysed collectively to understand their interrelation and interdependence 
to reach a holistic understanding of the phenomenon and its processes altogether. 
In addition, to reach an understanding that is critical, we must be aware of how 
nationalism is ultimately a human social construction, an invention, and can thus be 
analysed critically, i.e. in a manner where nothing is taken for granted, even if (and 
especially because) it has permeated so much of our social existence. 
Nationalism is intrinsically political by nature and as such it can function as an 
ideology which aim is to get people to think and act in a certain normative manner, 
which can in turn be analysed critically. The term ‘critically’ here refers to the view 
of how everything can be thought of having a purpose, i.e. that everything that is 
said, is said because something is trying to be achieved via this saying. These 
underlying reasons can then be identified, scrutinised, and analysed. This way, this 
thesis wants to lift the stigmata out of the social phenomenon of nationalism which 
in itself as a concept is objectively value-free and neutral, even to the point of being 
an empty signifier, which draws attention to the ways it can be used, abused, 
exploited, and taken advantage of. 
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As nationalism is not in any way ‘natural’ (discussed in section 1.1), required, or 
even needed in the most existentialist understanding of the word, its impactfulness 
cannot be contested, however. What must be done, is to examine where its power 
truly resides and from where it is derived, in addition to why do people attach 
themselves to it in so vast numbers and why it has become such an instrumental 
phenomenon in our construction of the social world. With the help of this 
framework, it is possible to explicate what it is exactly when someone is doing 
something in the name of nationalism. As stated earlier, very much is done by the 
right-wing ethno-nationalists but it is certainly not limited to only them. 
Nationalism is all around us, whether we like it or not, in all spheres of political, 
social, and domestic life. Because of this it is imperative that we ought to be able to 
understand it as completely as possible. The point is to “seek to understand the 
conditions under which they became [and are] central to modern politics and 
culture” (Özkırımlı 2010, 170). 
The scholar and the analysis of nationalism, in an academic setting at least, must also 
adhere to the proper science making mechanisms, namely impassion and objectivity 
and this is what Hobsbawm advocates for when he claims that the student of 
nationalism cannot be a nationalist themselves. The academic study of nationalism 
is to treat the subject as something to be explained rather than merely criticised or 
defended. A sense of healthy scepticism about nationalist claims is thus required 
(Spencer and Wollman 2002, 2) for a clear understanding of nationalism. Only when 
nothing is taken as a given can we see through the fog and start to make real sense 
of this complex issue that affects people’s lives the way it does and has done since 
the beginning of the modern era. 
This thesis looks at the previous analysis and handling of nationalism in an academic 
setting via dialectical approach where a thesis is countered with an antithesis which 
in turn leads to a synthesis that introduces us to new and broader horizons and thus 
allows for more rigorous and enlightened analysis and scholarly work to be done. 
The academic discourse around the phenomenon up until now seems to be just 
trivial bickering about classifications or categorisations and this thesis aims to 
bridge the gap between these ‘warring’ factions to create a synthesis. In this 
synthesis is where this thesis’ novel input into academia lies. Although one could 
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and can choose to emphasise one dimension over the others in their analysis, the 
interrelation and interdependence of the dimensions cannot be overlooked or 
denied and must always be taken into account one way or another. 
This thesis is not just a review of literature, however, but it also seeks to 
accommodate the findings of previous research in finding their common thread. By 
no means is this thesis exhaustive either. No matter how broad a handling we might 
take, omissions are bound to be made, considering space restrictions and the vast 
literature about the subject. This selection, while inevitably partial, nevertheless 
offers a clear reflection of the primary issues and main trends required for a holistic 
approach of the matter. If discussion about the approach should arise, it can only 
mean that a nerve has been struck within the subject and further excavation will 
occur, thus furthering the cause of nationalism studies. The illustrative nature of the 
approach (see Figure 1) suggested by this thesis enables scholars to start reaching 
a common ground in understanding the phenomenon and stop beating around the 
bush. 
The purpose of this thesis is thus to position already familiar (although contested) 
concepts in such a way that the convolution surrounding the phenomenon of 
nationalism itself would dissipate and allow for more fruitful analysis of this 
extremely complex issue. The point is to find out and argue what makes nationalism 
nationalism, what we need to take into consideration when studying it, what is 
indispensable in it, and what we can say critically about it. Nationalism is such a fluid 
and dynamic concept that we cannot be complacent in our handling of it as 
something concrete and absolute. Of course, one must keep in mind that each 
individual manifestation of nationalism differs from each other, but surely there is 
something in common to all of them which the framework this thesis advocates for 
helps in extracting. 
The convolution surrounding the term ‘nationalism’ and its use is due to its highly 
complex nature as a socio-political phenomenon. This complexity is derived from its 
constituent parts as they are themselves complex as well, and as such they have been 
used to mean nationalism by themselves. But in a similar fashion of how a wheel is 
comprised of a tyre and a rim, so is nationalism comprised of its constituent 
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elements, and what those elements are is what this thesis aims to find. In Figure 1 
we can see those elements, their contents, and their relationships explicated. 
Figure 1. The three dimensions of nationalism and their relationships. 
We will delve further into these dimensions in the upcoming sections of this thesis 
but a brief introduction is surely in order. As mentioned earlier, nationalism in the 
most basic understanding of the term is the formation of a political collective 
through nationalist argumentation. The dimensions presented in Figure 1 correlate 
with this definition: the collective is shaped in the psychological dimension; what 
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makes it political is explicated in the political dimension; while the ultimate 
formation i.e. the choices and decisions, are done in the discursive dimension. 
Anthony D. Smith, a well-cited and respected figure in nationalism studies and the 
late Professor Emeritus of Nationalism and Ethnicity in the London School of 
Economics, comes close our definition with his definition of nationalism, or actually 
definitions, which are five in total: 
1. “the whole process of forming and maintaining nations; 
2. a consciousness of belonging to the nation; 
3. a language and symbolism of the ‘nation’; 
4. an ideology (including a cultural doctrine of nations); 
5. a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and 
realize the national will” (1991, 72). 
It seems that Smith is unable to provide a single definition and almost opts out of 
the categorisation process altogether. This only goes to show how complex of an 
issue nationalism truly is. Still, let us see if we can make Smith’s definitions a bit 
more focussed, where we would not need five definitions but could do with just one. 
The first definition of Smith is perhaps the most general and thus, at least seemingly, 
easiest to understand as it talks about the whole process that goes on between 
nationalism and nations which reveals an almost teleological connection between 
them: when nations are under discussion, then surely we must be talking about 
nationalism. Fair enough, but this does not tell us in the least, what this process is, 
what it looks like or what it consists of. The remaining four definitions of Smith offer 
some answers regarding this. 
Even if these definitions cannot be separated from nationalism, some of them cannot 
even be separated from each other. Looking at points 2. and 3. of Smith, we can see 
that they both have to do with something psychological, i.e. something that goes on 
in the minds of individuals. The consciousness of belonging to a nation is perhaps 
not caused but certainly at least aided by the language and symbolism of it. This in 
turn manifests itself in or as the process of group formation via identity construction 
and formation. This connection adds to our proposition that one element of 
nationalism is this psychological dimension. 
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In connection to this, Smith’s definitions 4. and 5. seem to closely correlate with our 
political dimension. Through them we can see that nationalism has much to do 
with politics as it offers itself as an ideology, i.e. something normative to live, think, 
and act by as well as functioning as movement which has drawn up the goals to 
achieve. This dimension allows us to view nationalism as something political as it 
has the potential to affect people’s thinking and behaviour in such a manner which 
can be quite impactful societally, not least seen in how the world around us is 
organised through nation-states, for instance. In fact, the political dimension is the 
element of nationalism that elevates the collective that is identified as the polity of 
a ‘nation’; into something that is able to achieve something nationalistic, as this 
always happen via politics. 
Now that we have touched on two dimensions of nationalism we can look back at 
Smith’s first definition that was deemed quite general. But now that we know that 
in the process of nationalism there is already a psychological and a political 
dimension, we can start looking in more depth about how these dimensions add to 
the very formation and maintaining of nations. We can think of this process through 
the questions the dimensions try to answer. The psychological dimension 
essentially answers the question “what” as in what the nation is, i.e. what sort of 
people make up the nation and what is expected of them for them to be allowed to 
be a part of it in the first place. In other words, in the psychological dimensions is 
where the appearance of the nation is defined (discussed in Chapter 2). 
The political dimension (discussed in Chapter 3), in turn, answers the question 
“why” as in why it matters to be a nation as it offers things to achieve just because 
of the notion that nations should do something about their situation, whether to 
create their own nation-state or if it already exists, maintain it. What is left 
unanswered is, then, “where” this all happens which is what the third, discursive 
dimension of nationalism answers (discussed in Chapter 4). Nationalism is not 
some chemical compound that hovers around us no matter what, but it is a human 
construction, an invention, which has its own and varied objectives depending on 
who is using it. In this way, we can view nationalism as something that is performed 
and used to affect and even manipulate us as human beings, which happens 
ultimately through discourse. 
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Adding further to our proposition of three-dimensional nationalism, John Breuilly, 
another prominent scholar of nationalism and the current Professor of Nationalism 
and Ethnicity at LSE, has also made an observation of nationalism as a trifecta. His 
definitions of ‘sentiment’, ‘doctrine’, and ‘political’ (1996, 146) correlate strongly 
with the dimensions presented in this thesis. The ‘sentiment’ definition is very much 
in close connection with the psychological dimension this thesis argues for. But the 
term ‘sentiment’ is lacking as it only stresses the emotions that nationalism evokes 
in an individual or people, while the term ‘psychological’ emphasises the overall 
cognitive capabilities of them, cerebral as well as emotive, when it comes to identity 
construction and group formation. The psychological dimension thus includes the 
way people think as well as feel and how this is rationalised and ultimately realised 
in people’s minds. 
The political definition of Breuilly logically correlates with the political dimension 
where the nation’s political roadmap is drawn, while the third definition of the 
doctrine has much to do with the discursive dimension. It is in the doctrine where it 
is ultimately decided what to do and how, considering all the options that the two 
other dimensions feed to the doctrine, and this doctrine is essentially realised 
discursively because only through language and discourse can the arguments of 
nationalism make their way into the consciousness of the public. 
We are almost ready to start our deeper analysis of the dimensions but before that, 
let us take one more definition into consideration. Spencer and Wollman have 
defined nationalism as: 
an ideology which imagines the community in a particular way (as national), 
asserts the primacy of this collective identity over others, and seeks political 
power in its name, ideally (if not exclusively or everywhere) in the form of a 
state for the nation (or a nation state) (2002, 3). 
This definition further solidifies our three-dimensional proposition. From this quote 
we can see the three dimensions of nationalism in play. The psychological dimension 
is connected to the imagined community and its collective identity while the political 
dimension can be seen in viewing nationalism as an ideology that seeks political 
power. More implicit is the nature of the third, discursive, dimension but 
nevertheless, it is there. It is in how these connections between identity and politics 
10 
 
are mediated in such a way that makes it possible to achieve their respective goals 
and this is done through discourse where the means and possibilities are contested, 
discussed and put forth in their path to achieve completion. 
Drawing from these definitions this thesis is now able to offer its own definition of 
nationalism as a concept which empirical basis lays in the three-dimensional 
socio-political phenomenon where groups with distinct national identities 
aim to advance their political causes to implement change in their 
corresponding surroundings with the most suitable argumentation 
considering the context where it is present(ed). With this definition we are now 
able to move on to examining the phenomenon through the dimensions but not 
before some theoretical grounding. 
1.1 Nationalism as a modern social construct 
Before we can start our conceptual analysis of nationalism it must first be 
established that it certainly can be subjected under such treatment. This is possible 
because nationalism is a modern, socially constructed phenomenon. It is basically a 
human invention, to put it simply, as it is solely based on human cognition and 
action, and as such is constantly transforming (and transformed) and adapting (and 
adapted). It is modern in the sense that it has only permeated the human race since 
the 18th century, tied to the process of other modern institutions and systems 
emerging as well, and socially constructed in the sense that it is an arbitrary human 
invention meant to aid in visualising and justifying certain systems of existing and 
co-existing. 
Employing a sort of deconstructive view, one way of approaching the analytic 
properties of nationalism is first to define what it is not, namely primordial or 
perennial. According to these views, nationalism is something natural, default, or 
inherent in human life, i.e. that nationalism is something that has always been with 
us since the dawn of ages and thus will always continue to be. Actually, this 
primordialist view is one of the nationalists themselves (Özkırımlı 2010, 49) and as 
such it is normative and thus ideological which inevitably leads us to consider it 
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biased, which we can in this academic, objective, and critical setting debunk and 
reject. 
More importantly, to claim nationalism to be something natural, primordial or 
perennial would be to devoid it of any analytical potential which certainly is not the 
case. This is due to the fact that for us to be analytical we must also be critical and 
that cannot be done to these so called “natural” phenomena that cannot (or perhaps 
should not) be criticised. Mere description furthers the cause of human 
enlightenment and advancement very little which is why we must strive to seek 
proper understanding of the processes underway. If these processes are tried to be 
explained away with nationalism being fatalistic and preordained, it only serves to 
sustain or even protect nationalism’s unquestioned and unchecked rule of the land. 
There are, of course, alternatives to nationalism, and even if we cannot envision 
them epistemologically, it does not mean they cannot exist ontologically. 
Still, the world as we know it today is very much divided into nations but them being 
“the irreplaceable cells” of human existence, as Tudjman (1981, 289) argues, can 
certainly be contested. One only has to think about the isolated people living in the 
Amazonian rainforests that have stayed elusive for centuries and are only being 
found just now. It would certainly be quite a reach to claim that these people were 
something else or more, i.e. Brazilian, Peruvian, Ecuadorian etc. depending on the 
geographical location which they inhabit, than the immanent community they do 
share, or them even considering a nation of their own. 
This is due to the fact that the term ‘nation’ refers only to a way of group formation 
and identification for people already a part of it or willing to become a part of it or 
even differentiating from it, and as such the ‘nation’ is an arbitrary construct; it in 
itself cannot have or contain things such as rights, morality, freedom, will, self-
determination. This sort of thinking stems from a twisted way of looking at Kant, 
whose emphasis was on the individual and their “unchanging rights” (Berlin 1996, 
223). In the early stages of modernity, nationalist thinking, however, attributed 
these rights to the nation as well, treating the nation as an autonomous individual in 
the process when moving forward with the project of self-realisation. 
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The anthropomorphisation of this kind is not alien even today as for instance it is 
quite common to see it in the neoliberal discourse where institutions such as those 
of the sectors of industry, finance and service provision, in addition to the ‘brands’ 
they consist of, are presented as autonomous entities that can only thrive in the 
context of the free and unregulated marketplace. But these institutions, including 
nations are not some sentient beings whose preferences can be objectively 
examined. Nations cannot think, they are always thought for, used and abused, by 
people with various reasons including but not limited to manipulation for personal 
gains. These institutions, nations among them, are not some inorganic machinations 
or forces beyond our control. Instead, they are nothing but conglomerations of 
people and as such have much to gain to be able to influence the ways how to 
organise humans’ co-existence and actions, i.e. the place we call society. In this way, 
the crucial political element inherent in nationalism becomes evident once more. 
One critique that the primordial and perennial views have against the modern view 
of nationalism is where they claim that people have organised themselves nationally 
long before the modern era, e.g. Egyptians, Romans, or pre-modern European 
‘nations’ such as the English or the French. The modernist view, however, holds 
these polities to not be nations per se but rather civilisations and communities of a 
larger context. These civilisations, no matter what we call them today, did not have 
or at least exhibit any elements that are vital regarding the process of nationalism. 
For Renan, there were no nations in pre-modern times, just “republics, municipal 
kingdoms, confederations of local republics and empires” (1990, 9). It is only when 
the political element inherent to nationalism is introduced to these people, can we 
talk of nationalism. Consider Hayes: 
We can be sure that prior to the eighteenth century A.D. it was not the general 
rule for civilized nationalities to strive zealously and successfully for political 
unity and independence, whereas it has been the general rule in the last 
century and a half. Universal mass-nationalism of this kind, at any rate, has no 
counterpart in earlier eras; it is peculiar to modern times. (1931, 292–3) 
The perennialists are those who hold that while nations might not be natural, certain 
continuities do exist between the concepts of nations ancient and modern (Smith 
1998, 43). While this is true (and it most certainly is because to claim that history is 
a continuum is only to utter a tautology), when it comes to socio-political systems 
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and changes within and between them, nothing comes about ex nihilo. Without 
modernism and the different phenomena that emerged with it, there would be no 
such talk of nations that we do have today because nationalism created nations and 
not the other way around (Gellner 2006, 39) in the sense that we today have grown 
used to thinking. 
Actually, Ernest Gellner, the arch-modernist and one of the most respected and 
quoted scholars of nationalism, has a most critical view of the issue: 
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men [sic], as an inherent […] 
political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing 
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often 
obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality (2006, 48–9). 
Here we see that to hold nations as something natural or inherent in humankind is 
quite naïve as it is truly “a myth” i.e. make-believe. If one were to claim this, one is 
consequently also begging the question of when did then the humans begin, which 
illustrates this point quite effectively. Was the Cro-Magnon a nationalist? Did Adam 
and Eve have their own nation? Were their ‘societies’ organised according to 
nationalistic sentiments? Certainly not, or as Kedourie would have it: 
Humanity is not naturally divided into “nations”. The characteristics of any 
particular “nation” are neither easily ascertainable nor exclusively inherent in 
it; while to insist that the only legitimate type of government is national self-
government is capriciously to dismiss the great variety of political 
arrangements to which men [sic] have given assent and loyalty and to strive 
after a state of affairs the attempt to realize […] would be, in the nature of 
things, both ruinous and futile. (1971, 28) 
The modernist standpoint is thus quite simple: nationalism was invented because it 
needed to be invented, even if the reasons why it needed to be invented are varied. 
There were entities, communes, gatherings of people that we can call ‘nations’ in 
layman’s terms but to be precise these ancient or pre-modern civilizations were not 
in fact nations. Because even if the term ‘nation’ itself might predate modernity, as 
what primordialists and perennialists claim, the nations of auld were only defined 
through their ethnical similarities and thus lacked the political connotation so 
instrumental to the current understanding of the phenomenon which came with 
modernity. Nationalism thus becomes not just simply a claim of ethnic similarity, 
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but a claim that ethnic similarity should count as the definition of a political 
community (Calhoun 1997, 9). 
In other words, nationalism is what makes the nations matter. It provides a sense of 
agency to them, creating a ‘common’ or ‘general’ will which puts the nation first and 
which can also be advocated and advanced. This all has to do with the political aspect 
of nationalism, mainly the inseverable link between nations as a people and the rule 
of the people, which we can also call democracy.  With these ‘nations’ of old, their 
only political denominator was to be subjected under a common ruler whose rulable 
territory varied from time to time and with it did the people of the ‘nation’ as well. 
When democracies started to appear the territories under their rule followed the 
pre-existing ones that the previous rulers had been able to claim and these then in 
turn became the state. The state thus becomes the penultimate conglomerate of 
people as kingdoms were replaced by democracies. There also functions an 
exchange: in turn for the political cohesion that the people and democracy brings, 
the state offers cultural cohesion for the people to attach themselves into even more, 
which creates a constant but cyclical formation and reformation of nationalism. The 
relationship between nationalism and democracy is examined further in section 3.1. 
Historically speaking, why nationalism happened the way it did, and is happening 
the way it is today, can be attributed to modernism. While some might think of this 
as the “modernist fallacy” of nationalism as it fails “to grasp the continuing relevance 
and power of pre-modern ethnic ties and sentiments in providing a firm base for the 
nation-to-be” (Smith 1995, 40), the modernist view does not reject or deny these 
perennial notions and their importance or significance. It only argues that they are 
not enough to wholly explain nationalism by themselves. Smith’s “ethnic cores” 
(1991, 21), while valuable, only tell us about the base and basics for group 
formation, such as family. 
To put it bluntly, Smith is only telling us that nationalism happened or happens 
because people exists and thrive through co-operation which really does not get us 
very far in our analysis. Similarly, following Reynolds, we cannot claim that pre-
modern peoples were nationalistic in nature as their “whole set of ideas about the 
collective nature of peoples was too unsystematic” (1984, 302). The communal base 
15 
 
of people at that time was fixed to other elements than of a nation, to those of smaller 
communities, such as those required for the viability of the agriculture that 
sustained the inhabitants. 
Even if we cannot pinpoint the exact location in history when nationalism began or 
came to be, we can say that it is in close connection to the spread of Enlightenment 
values and the locus classicus of the French Revolution (discussed in section 3.1.2) 
to which these values ultimately led to (Kedourie 1993, 9; Calhoun 1997, 9). Of 
course, one cannot assume that there is or has been a somewhat “pure” moment or 
model of nationalism from which one can derive the essence of nationalism either, 
but with proper excavation of key concepts of which the phenomenon consists of 
and then identifying their occurrences in space and time allows us to draw these 
critical generalisations about the nature of it all. 
Spencer and Wollman (2002, 43) have raised doubts about how fruitful or 
acceptable it is to equate the notions of people, state and nation, which was 
promoted around the time of the French Revolution, and whether or not nationalism 
was linked to progress. These doubts are not without basis but if we look at the 
autocratic rule of the king at the time which ceased with the Revolution and ushered 
in the era of democracy, even while not nearly in that sort of form that we today 
equate with democracy, it nevertheless was most definitely a step forward. This is 
also what Hobsbawm means with his inclusionary and progressive nationalism 
(1996, 257). 
Hobsbawm’s modernist handling of nationalism, where historical processes are of 
key importance in the shaping and understanding of the phenomenon, counters 
most effectively the alleged universal, natural, inevitable claims of primordialists 
and perennialists. Nationalism, being a social phenomenon, of course did not go 
around in a vacuum minding its own business but interacted with other movements 
and dynamics (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 43). But being a modern phenomenon 
which means that it “belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent 
period” (Hobsbawm 1992, 9), nationalism left its mark on other and was in turn 
transformed by other modern phenomena including but not limited to “state-
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building, democratization, language construction, scientific racism, socialism inter 
alia” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 43). 
Hobsbawm, a historian by trade, draws the distinction between two forms, or 
possible viewings of nationalism: one of unity, other of separation. One possible 
explanation for this could be that during the era when nation-states were formed in 
the end of the nineteenth century that is, the aim was to make as large as possible 
entities where the emphasis was more on the political and territorial lines and not 
so much on ethnic ones; smaller communities were easier to unite under one 
government and as time passed, certain groups might have found their 
representation lacking and have thus sought to separate these groups from those 
already in power. 
It has been argued that this idea was not nationalist but state-based, drawing on not 
the nation but sovereign people. However, these are two sides of the same coin. The 
sovereign people are the nation within the state, which is the very essence of 
nationalism. This view only separates the psychological (based on ethnicity) 
dimension from the political (based on rights), while also erroneously claiming that 
the latter has got nothing to do with nationalism while it most certainly has. 
When talking about the other, separatist form of nationalism, Hobsbawm refers to 
the “exclusive nationalism of states or right-wing political movements which 
substitutes itself for all other forms of political and social identification” (1992, 145). 
This way the ethnic has almost superseded the political, when the argument goes 
along the lines of ‘here we are like this and only this and we live and should live like 
this and only like this’. Unfortunately, when based on ethnic divisions, the very 
lamentable considerations of resentment, fear and insecurity will begin to direct the 
discussion. Nationalism most certainly did start out as mostly a political movement 
but through these twists and turns it has experienced as time has passed, it has been 
centring around a stronger ethnic focus since the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century – a trajectory which still continues on today. 
One modern phenomenon that aided in the rise and spreading of nationalism is 
industrialisation. It is not by itself alone the catalyst what put nationalism in motion, 
but it certainly has played an instrumental part in spreading nationalism to the 
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extent that many now see the idea of nation so obvious and even self-evident. For 
Gellner, the new industrial societies brought about a new division of labour 
compared to the agrarian societies. In these pre-modern societies, the vast majority 
of the population lived in fairly isolated communities but under an authority of some 
sort and all that was expected of them was to farm the land they inhabited and pay 
their taxes, rents, tenths etc. in time. A common and shared culture was thus not 
needed as people did not really need co-operation in the sense and scale that 
nationalism requires and pre-requisites. (2006, 11) 
Perhaps the most vital component for the spread and attachment of nationalism 
ushered by modernism thus becomes the production of mass-communication 
systems. Communication, in this context, is to be understood in its broadest capacity, 
as that of which entails all possible systems of cultural dissemination of information. 
Helping us understand this, Gellner offers us two different concepts of culture: ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ (Gellner 1996, 102), where the former is equated with the homogenous 
elite and the latter with the heterogeneous masses. Pre-modern nations were highly 
hierarchical, fixed, and static when it came to social mobility, and culture was a way 
of enforcing this differentiation between social classes. But modern industrial 
societies which are characterised with having high levels of social mobility required 
the dissemination of a culture that would homogenise the people which in turn came 
to mean the nation. 
Gellner’s concept of ‘high culture’ does not mean what could hastily be thought to 
mean in the vernacular the appreciation of the so called ‘finer’ arts such as operas 
and visiting galleries, but rather his concept of ‘high’ has actually more to do with 
the overreaching or overarching capability of the concept. The high culture is not 
high because it is somehow more prestigious or ‘better’, but high because it is 
disseminated from higher ground. In other words, we could speak of the culture, as 
in the culture that is needed to spread as widely as possible in order for people to 
be attuned to it. The high had to be infused with the low which requires intensified 
modes of conveying information which ultimately turns into the creation of the myth 
of a homogenous cultural unit, i.e. the nation. 
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In here lies the crux: the information needed to pervade people’s consciousness to 
be effective, and to do this the information needed to be able to spread as wide as 
possible. For Anderson this is the printed word (2006, 18) while Gellner (1997, 16), 
echoing Rousseau (2001, 79), attributes this to the state-driven education system. 
While they are not entirely identical, these elements do have much in common, 
namely the objective to influence the understanding of the people and ultimately 
attain their acceptance of the policies presented. These policies offered, or imposed, 
people with identities which, were they to accept them, would prove their 
membership of this new cultural unit where communication and mobility is easier 
and more fluid. Or as Anderson puts it: “So often in the ‘nation-building’ policies of 
the new states one sees both a genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm and 
systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass 
media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth” (2006, 
113–14). 
Nevertheless, it must be said that to view nations as imagined, inventions, or 
constructions is not the same as to suggest them being not real, or that even if 
“nationalism is part of a social imaginary is not to say that nations are mere figments 
of the imagination” (Calhoun 2007, 41). The importance of the ideas behind the 
concepts of nation and nationalism cannot be overstated as they provide the 
framework through which the societies of today are mostly organised. They are thus 
extremely powerful in constituting our societies and thus must be examined with 
utmost criticality. The constructivist agenda is to clarify these processes of 
construction of nationalism and “to identify the mechanisms through which they are 
sustained and, just as importantly, resisted or challenged” (Özkırımlı 2010, 198). An 
efficient and felicitous way of doing this is to identify the central concepts most 
crucial to the phenomenon and around which it operates and from which it draws 
its strength to have a clear as well as deep understanding of its power over society 
and human life in general. 
1.2 Analysing nationalism conceptually 
Using concept analysis, this thesis is able to critically study what are the concepts, 
notions, and ideas that the phenomenon of nationalism actually consists of. The 
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underlying feature of political theory, political philosophy, and politology in general, 
is to look at the various ways how key concepts are and can be understood, i.e. what 
is x, so to speak. This requires ontological theorisation (Guzzini 2013, 522), in other 
words, reflective communication with the key concepts themselves, which provides 
and offers the scholar understanding of that of which exists, in addition to where 
and how. This, in turn, allows the conceptualisation of the phenomenon under 
examination by naming and attaching meanings to its various traits, those of which 
the phenomenon ultimately and essentially consists of (Berenskoetter 2016, 11). In 
this sense, it can be considered to be constitutive theorisation, as it primarily 
functions as theorisation regarding a certain central phenomenon which thus 
constitutes the whole subject under investigation. 
Concepts are irreplaceable when building theories. One cannot know of what they 
are talking about unless they can first be able to define it. Concepts are not thus only 
ontological building blocks, or basic assumptions for theories and theorisation, they 
are also components out of which theorists form their claims and arguments. 
Guzzini has put it well when he states that concepts “are the words in which, but also 
for which, our theorizing is done” (2013, 535; emphasis added). It is most important 
to realise that while concepts function as the means through which theories and 
understanding is possible to achieve in the first place, they are also the location of 
where this understanding resides. If we get down to brass tacks, to use such an 
idiosyncratic phrase, concepts are the only possible way of understanding the 
various political phenomena and the theories related to them, epistemologically 
speaking. 
For instance, in the context of this thesis, only through its constitutive concepts can 
we truly grasp what nationalism consists of, how it is thought and spoken of. Of 
course, one must be aware of the co-constitutive process of it all; the concepts used 
mould the theories simultaneously while the theories mould the concepts. Concepts 
thus provide us not only the language through which we can form the phenomena 
we want to explain and understand, but also the frameworks that are built to explain 
and understand them in the first place (Berenskoetter 2016, 2). The objective of 
concept analysis is thus to build a dictionary that can never be exhaustively 
completed and will always thus be chronically unfinished (Guzzini 2013, 523), 
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simply because of the fact that the society and the world we inhabit is in a constant 
state of flux itself, never reaching finality. 
Be that as it may, this in no way hinders or undermines the purpose of concept 
analysis. It allows us to examine how things are spoken of and how it is even possible 
to talk about them. Through it, we can try to find the common thread out of which 
we can create new knowledge and understanding. This happens dialectically via 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and by taking account and utilising the intellectual 
history and anchoring of the concepts in question. Concept analysis in this way is 
very much connected to the linguistic turn that happened within social studies 
which allowed more analytical philosophy to seep into the bloodstream of the 
science. In this sense this thesis aims to compile a dictionary of nationalism, or 
nationalism studies at least, with its key concepts and the understanding of them 
and how incomplete it will turn out to be in the end, only future studies and research 
can show. 
As it would be impossible to review the thousands and thousands of studies 
concerning nationalism done in the past, this thesis’ main interest resides in finding 
out the central or key concepts that are generally found to be present in it. Following 
the framework presented by Michael Freeden in his book Ideologies and Political 
Theory: A Conceptual Approach (1996) which enables the morphologic study of 
ideologies and where it is said that ideologies consist of concepts spread around 
three levels: central, medium and periphery. Drawing from previous research and 
their findings, this thesis aims to identify those central concepts around which the 
discussion of nationalism, at least in an academic setting, has been revolving and 
then compile them in such a way that could aid further research in excavating and 
identifying even more concepts that could be introduced to further our 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
Concepts are permeated by an underlying feature of abstractness, in that they are 
complex and highly malleable. No single concept – even the concept of ‘concept’ – is 
just one singular notion because concepts never just ‘are’ or ‘exist’. They are social 
constructions, coined and developed by humans, and their form is not only 
internally complex but it also varies significantly, and any attempt to grasp this form 
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of a concept is a form of conceptualisation in itself. Following Ophir (2011), just the 
act of defining a concept includes talk of its appearance and with it a reflexive 
approach, which in turn leads to concept analysis. Concept is thus always a complex, 
intricate, and open-ended formation, highly dependable by its surroundings. 
To be exact, a certain concept is talked about as a ‘concept’ exactly and only then 
when that which it fundamentally refers to is tried to be explained and expressed. 
Because of this, we need to be clear that when theorising about nationalism, we are 
actually dealing with the concept. Empiricism behind the concept that is derived 
from the phenomenon allows other concepts to be attached to it. The meaning of 
this process is explicitly to create an ontological category of the phenomenon, so that 
discussion about it and even the very understanding of it could even be possible. 
Concepts can thus only appear through conceptualisation. This also draws the line 
between a term and a concept, where the first is only a general instrument of 
everyday language use while the latter is brought about only when a term is 
removed from its everyday usage and its meaning is started to be analysed more 
thoughtfully. In other words, a term lacks the deeper, critical understanding of the 
phenomenon that it refers to that a concept requires. 
As a general starting point it could be said that a concept is an abstract frame which 
helps in creating knowledge about the world around us by organising, naming and 
giving meanings to its features (Berenskoetter 2016, 4). Or, in the words of Max 
Weber, concepts are a way to overcome “the extensively and intensively infinite 
multiplicity” that is the empirical reality (cited in Burger 1987, 77). They are nodes 
that we attach ourselves epistemologically while providing the ontology that they 
constitute. Goertz has stated this quite comprehensively in his statement of how 
“[c]oncepts are about ontology […] [t]o develop a concept is more than providing a 
definition: it is deciding what is important about an entity” (2006, 27; emphasis in 
the original). The process of naming something conceptuality is not thus just mere 
description but also interpretation and characterisation (Connolly 1993, 23). 
Every attempt of defining a concept thus includes some kind of a selective process 
and even a seemingly exact definition can still have multiple meanings and is thus 
left open to a myriad of interpretations, of which to discuss and thus constantly 
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sharpen the concept even more. It is left to the interpreter, namely the scholar who 
is doing the research, to make their choices visible and transparent as possible and 
justify their choices in a manner that can stand up to critical dissection of their peers 
regarding the subject at hand. This allows us to move forever closer to the dictionary 
definition of a concept, even if it cannot be reached in its totality. 
As it is an abstract and a heuristic tool, a concept cannot be regarded as an exact, 
unconditional rendering of reality. It is more of a mental image, that has the capacity 
and ability to organise the sensory, perceived reality in a meaningful way. This 
organisation happens primarily through language because it is in language where 
concepts reside in their most basic form. But there is a more cognitive aspect to it 
all as well because even if there was some fixed, irremovable, almost ‘pure’ form of 
a concept, it can never be reached, as its examination always happens through 
language, which makes them social and intersubjective constructions which derive 
their meanings through “language games” as Wittgenstein (2010, 8) would have it. 
Through these language games, it is usual to attach concepts to words, to further the 
understanding surrounding the issue at hand. But to exactly which words the 
concept is attached to, varies. This is why a concept is always more than the word 
which is uttered, when we want to refer to the socio-political phenomenon to which 
it is connected to. In other words, and in the context of this thesis, the phenomenon 
of nationalism is more than the word ‘nationalism’. A single word points to just one 
certain thing whereas a concept seizes and connects various elements, views and 
experiences and binds them together to form a new cohesive whole. 
Much like Jacques Lacan’s point de capiton (1993, 268) through which signifiers and 
signified are tied together, so does a concept function as a nodal point of this kind as 
well. This does not, however, mean that a concept is an all-encompassing umbrella 
term, the meaning of which that could just be derived by simply connecting all its 
constitutive elements, because the concept in itself is required a priori to make 
possible the connections and orders of these elements that the concept consists of. 
As Reinhart Koselleck has said, a concept is not just a simple explanation of the 
relationships involved within it, but an intrinsic part of the whole process of 
explanation (2004, 86). 
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Even though we have established that concepts, and especially politological 
concepts, cannot be defined in a completely exhaustive manner as they can only be 
interpreted, it is important to notice that through concepts we are able to move 
away from the referential word that the concept is attached to, and approach the 
sphere of empiricism where different context are taken into account in the 
explaining process and how this affects the understanding of the concept. This has 
much to do with the fact that concept analysis is not a strict, singular method, in a 
traditional sense of the word, as a way of doing analysis, but rather a stance, a 
temperament, a way of asking, if you will. One way to approach this issue is the 
approach of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) suggested by Koselleck in his 
aptly named book Begriffsgeschichten (2006). Its starting point is the treatment of a 
concept in a historical manner by tracing its development through the ages and 
excavate as many interpretations regarding it as possible. 
The point of conceptual history is to find out how a concept has been understood 
and used in the past in addition to how it or its use has developed or evolved. These 
processes in turn can lead to those meanings and interpretations that are currently 
in use today. However, the purpose of it is not just a historical examination but also 
to create and offer a better understanding of how concepts make us think or guide 
us to think through certain ways, which, in turn, enables the construction of 
alternative definitions. The nature of concepts being highly malleable and open-
ended, as previously established, this basic principle guides the historical treatment 
as well. Through this, four different stages of a concept’s formation can be identified: 
(1) the genesis of a concept or how a new concept is created in a distinct historical 
context; (2) the reification of the concept and the way it is used as it is; (3) 
transformation or how the concept’s meanings alters; and (4) disappearance if the 
use of the concept is ceased and it slips out of the vocabulary altogether. 
But conceptual history is not only interested in describing these dynamic 
relationships as it also aims to explain why certain concepts appear where they do 
and when they do, and why they change and/or disappear. The emphasis lies in 
studying the change of concepts and their use, and according to conceptual history, 
that change always happens through certain events at certain times. This leads to a 
search for balance between synchronic analysis where a concept is studied in a 
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certain time and place and diachronic analysis where a concept is looked at through 
time and space. The research question defines to which of these one should focus on 
and in the context of this thesis a certain synthesis of the two would prove to be most 
fruitful. Without a doubt, we are looking at the concept of nationalism from a 
contemporary point of view and setting which would hint at a more synchronic 
analysis but to attain a more holistic approach it is certainly useful to look at 
nationalism and its constitutive concepts in a more wider historical context, which 
leads to a diachronic handling of the issue. 
This thesis does not follow conceptual history and its suggestions for analysis point 
by point but nevertheless has much to draw from it. The aim of this thesis is to 
identify the concepts most crucial and irreplaceable that make up the phenomenon 
of nationalism. This inevitably leads to a whole network of concepts that nationalism 
is connected to, where each concept could be subjected to a conceptual history 
handling. But because of space limitations, as it would be impossible to deal with the 
whole oeuvre that is nationalism studies throughout all its history, this thesis’s focus 
is on the concept of nationalism and to explain that super- or macro-concept of 
nationalism through the micro-concepts that are present in it. The point here is to 
show how these particular concepts fit and work in the context of nationalism itself. 
Of course, if and wherever these processes of change and transformation are 
identified they and the reasons for them will be taken into account in the analysis. 
In addition to the historical handling of concepts, another approach with which to 
analyse them is the “political/critical approach” suggested by Berenskoetter (2016, 
17–20). It is based on the notion that knowledge equals power, and as concepts fill 
a certain cognitive gap, they are a central part in the production of knowledge and 
in this capacity function as instruments in constructing and maintaining power 
structures. The political/critical approach to concept analysis has a Foucauldian 
objective to identify and demolish the power structures that are found 
disproportionate, which are maintained via established concepts and patterns of 
thought, and as such to open doors to alternative interpretations which could lead 




According to this kind of approach, when dealing with concepts, there is always an 
inherent politically loaded element to it all, because there is always a reason for 
someone to use a concept the way they do. This is what needs to be examined in 
order to reveal its problematic nature. In other words, the political/critical approach 
is interested in finding out how a certain kind of knowledge is produced, i.e. how 
concepts are used in the society and what kind of outcomes they deliver. It is crucial, 
for this approach, to keep in mind that by giving meanings to things, concepts are 
not only making them more understandable but also systematically forming the 
objects which they are talking about, as it is only through these concepts that the 
talking and understanding is even possible in the first place (Foucault 2002, 49). 
This is why this thesis treats the concept of nationalism in itself neutral, while still 
acknowledging that the very phenomenon it is attached to is multifaceted and value-
laden. 
In the political/critical approach nothing is taken as a given and it is thus opposed 
to the view that concepts could have just one single exhaustive definition. It is 
connected to the historical approach in the sense that it also examines the 
development of concepts within socio-political constructs. Where the approaches 
differ, however, is that the historical one is interested in just pointing out the change 
that a concept can undergo in time while the political/critical view wants to show 
how a concept constituted in a certain manner is just one possible way of looking at 
it. No matter how fixed the power structure, which interest is to uphold the view it 
would like to represent, it is possible to shed light on the illusionary aspect of it 
through this critical viewing. In addition, where the historical approach is attuned 
to find the alternative interpretations of a concept in history, the political/critical 
one is able to create brand new interpretations, even if some of its cognitive fuel 
would stem from history in some way or another. It aims to deconstruct the 
historical narrative of a concept and reconstruct it anew by connecting to it new, 
possibly marginalised, suppressed or forgotten views and interpretations. 
*** 
Now that we have established what we are aiming to do in examining the 
phenomenon of nationalism, we are ready to turn to the phenomenon itself. In the 
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next three sections of the thesis, the three dimensions that make up the 
phenomenon of nationalism are analysed respectively in detail. It is within these 
dimensions that the concepts, notions, and ideas inherent to them are based and 
thus require a critical examination what that truly entails and means. In Chapter 2, 
the psychological dimension, concerning questions of e.g. identity, group formation 
and ethnicity is analysed. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the examination of the political 
dimension, where another essential part of nationalism resides, i.e. the action-based 
behaviour which makes nationalism what it is. Chapter 4 deals with the discursive 
dimension, in which the notions, ideas, and concepts presented by the other two 
dimensions are collected into a socially and politically viable whole that can be 
further transmitted to the public arena as a narrative so that it could gain support 
as well as legitimacy for its existence in the first place. Chapter 5 functions as the 
discussion part of this thesis and in it the interdependence and interconnectedness 
of the three dimensions is further elaborated in addition to arguing how nationalism 
functions as an apparatus which moulds a pluralist world into a monistic worldview. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter 6 where the findings of this thesis are 
summarised and further suggestions for using the framework identified and 




2 DECEIVING APPEARANCES – THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
Before venturing further into the dimensions, let us remind ourselves of our task of 
proving how the phenomenon of nationalism functions as an instrument in forming 
a political collective. It is in this collective and what is meant with it where we start 
our analysis. We already hinted earlier that the collective is based on the 
psychological dimension this we elaborate now. When discussing about 
nationalism, one cannot help but to consider the questions of identity, especially the 
question of national identity. As this thesis claims, the question of this kind of 
identity formation is nothing but basic group formation and the identity building 
that stems from that. It only becomes truly national when the other dimensions are 
introduced to it. 
Nevertheless, the psychological dimension is where all the possible ideas, notions 
and concepts that allow this sort of identity construction to happen reside and this 
is also why it is most suitable that we start our analysis from there. In essence, the 
psychological dimension deals with the question of ‘what’ the nation is. This is 
because its purpose is to define the appearance of the nation, what it looks like as 
well as what it does not. This way the psychological dimension is very much identity-
based and can be subjected to critical examination which deals with such issues. 
2.1 Identity and group formation 
To posit a national identity, or any other kind of identity for that matter, always 
involves drawing certain and particular distinctions that inevitably form divisions 
and contrasts between the newfound ‘me’ and the ‘other’ consisting of ones unlike 
me. Rée (1992, 7) has even suggested that it is an inherent part of the concept of 
identity to presume an ‘other’ that is different. To make the issue more collective, 
this personal identity construction evolves into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ formation where 
those identifying and fitting with the given identity can gather around one 
description and prescription. These distinctions are always subjective and value-
laden in the sense that they can ever manifest only in the consciousness of 
individuals no matter how far reaching, spread or shared they might be. They can 
appear to be objective and neutral in their broadness, but can also differ between 
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individuals who identify with the same kind of (national) identity as no two 
individuals can ever be identically alike. Thus identity is nothing else but a pack of 
abstractions. 
This is also what Benedict Anderson means with his highly influential and widely 
cited “imagined communities” which is also the name of his book of 2006 (first 
published in 1983). Imagined is exactly what this common identity is, because no 
matter how small a nation, the members of it cannot ever be acquainted with every 
single one of each other. This means the identity is essentially formed in the minds 
of people as abstractions. Because of this, and also because of Breuilly’s (1996, 162) 
view of calling this nationalism as sentiments, consciousness, or common-sense 
ideas and feelings, it is suitable to call it the psychological dimension because of its 
psycho-physical nature of being something cerebral as well as emotive. In addition, 
already in 1985, Anthony Giddens used the word “psychological” to describe the 
phenomenon of nationalism, highlighting its mental capacities (219). 
2.1.1 A question of choice – creating arbitrary lines of demarcation 
The attributes, qualities, characteristics etc. that one wishes and chooses to ascribe 
to their identity, were it personal or collective by nature, might not be looking to 
create divisions in the first place, only to search for some sort of belonging and 
positioning. One is always trying to attach positive inclinations to one’s self, because 
the opposite, to fix negative attributes would be irrational, illogical and absurd. 
However, irrespective of how well-intended or benevolent the preliminary 
intention might be, the process of choosing these characteristics is nevertheless just 
that – a choice. 
When choosing these seemingly positive qualities, there will inevitably be unwanted 
qualities left out of the equation, which then make up the putative and negative 
‘them’ that is in opposition to the positive ‘us’ (Billig 1995, 18). The formation of a 
group identity requires a certain process of categorisation so that one is able to 
distinguish between those who are similar enough to be included and those who are 
different and must thus be excluded. That is why this process of categorisation must 
be looked at as a two-way process, i.e. as Zolberg has noted, “to understand the 
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process of inclusion, we must consider it simultaneously as a process of exclusion” 
(1996, 57). 
Before looking more closely into the qualities and characteristics that can be 
ascribed to identity it must be said that once these attributes are established, they 
can become quite implicit and covert, or “banal” as Billig states in his book of 1995, 
aptly named Banal Nationalism. His claim is that the prevalence of the national 
identity becomes so ubiquitous, established and mundane through different 
institutions, e.g. weather forecasts, newspapers, broadcasting and sports, that it 
goes unquestioned most of the time in people’s lives. This inevitably leads to a sort 
of hierarchy between one’s own nation and those foreign, which once again is closely 
connected to the inherent nature of the us/them construction altogether. Because 
of this fetishistic character of it all where we are constantly bombarded with “flags, 
uniforms, airplane logos, maps, anthems, national flowers, national cuisines and 
architectures” (McClintock 1996, 274) and other spectacles, it becomes more and 
more easy to see how people could start to look at nations and national identity with 
it as something natural and organic as it is, after all, all around us, which makes it all 
but impossible not be affected by it. 
This reification of the national identity leads to treating it as something fixed, closed 
and immutable (Handler 1994, 27) even if, epistemologically and ontologically 
speaking, “identity and memory are political and social constructs” and that they 
“are not things we think about but things we think with [and as] such they have no 
existence beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories” (Gillis 1994, 5; 
emphasis added). Of course, this does not mean that everyone who becomes in 
contact with this is influenced in such a way that they become automatically 
adjusted and indoctrinated. In a similar manner that the national identity chooses 
its qualities, so can its receivers select what they choose to hear and draw different 
meanings from them. This is, however, against the wishes of the nationalists as they 
seek to create and build an exact and single representation of a nation with its 
distinct identity, and to which no alternatives can be suggested. One only needs to 
look at the populist demagogues of e.g. Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, Russia, and 
even China to see how they use nationalist rhetoric and constructions of a single 
nation to attain popularity to advance their cause. 
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As identities are not fixed but fluid, in that they have the capacity, ability and 
potential to change over time, it is better to look at them as processes of 
identification (Hall 1996, 1). Identities and with them national identities are thus 
open-ended in the sense that they can change according to in any manner that is 
deemed suitable. This is opposite of what the nationalists have to say as their claims 
and arguments are based on the alleged rootedness and security of the fixed and 
normative national image, which is an important aspect when considering the 
appeal of the phenomenon (Finlayson 1998, 145). 
As the process of forming one’s identity is anything but an easy task, with all the 
above mentioned fluidity and flux involved, identifying with the image of the nation 
a person can reach some sense of closure and stability about themselves. National 
identification offers simple answers and solutions to complex questions and 
problems that can ultimately be answered only by the individual (ibid.). Not only 
does the psychological dimension include the concepts that make up the national 
identity or image, it also takes into account how these concepts can be used in a 
deceptive manner (usually by nationalist leaders) to evoke and share potentially 
very powerful feelings including but not limited to love, hate, resentment, fear and 
anger (Vogler 2000, 30), which are a key part of the lure of it all. 
National identity or consciousness is not something that comes from within people 
ex nihilo, as some sort of psychological accessory they are born with and which is 
perpetually within reach. It must first be established as something that people can 
attach themselves to because “people must know what that identity is” (Özkırımlı 
2010, 172). In this way, the nation really is just assumptions that are based on 
externalities which are given from above. Identity construction and the 
psychological dimension of nationalism with it is thus the search for common 
denominators between individual and groups, were they language, ethnicity, 
religion or other cultural indicators or symbols of being, existing, and behaving. 
Historically this has been seen as including but not limited to a collective proper 
name, a shared myth of common ancestry, certain elements of differentiating 
common culture, historical memories (such as the heroes and adoration of war 
narratives), homeland, and solidarity. 
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Actually, these symbols do not differ much from how a family is constructed, 
mentally at least. They are only a part of group consciousness and formation, and do 
not yet consist of nationalism by itself but what matters is that these beliefs exist 
and are effective no matter how rational or irrational they might be. Smith, an ardent 
advocate of ethno-symbolism, has acknowledged this as well: 
For ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power are the myths, 
memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a 
popular living past has been and can be rediscovered and reinterpreted by 
modern nationalist intelligentsias (1999, 9). 
Nationalism draws power from history, yes, but it is the modern nationalists who 
use these historical myths, memories, traditions and symbols as devices for their 
own creations. Without nationalism, these traditions would not be used, which 
makes it a choice made by the nationalists while creating their own version of the 
invented ‘common past’. These myths, symbols, invented pasts etc. are not required 
for nationalism, but they can be used and often are, and very saliently and effectively 
at that. The particular common past or history is by no means an unquestionable, 
inherent element of the nation but it is nationalism which materialises the histories 
and retrospectively constitutes them as ‘national’ (Calhoun 1993, 229). In other 
words, ethno-symbolism only has identified the seeds to be sown while nationalism 
makes the harvest. The customs, traditions, beliefs, shared or common past, public 
gatherings, rituals, ceremonies, symbols, emblems etc. are used instrumentally by 
nationalism to create, recreate and reify the nation day in and day out. 
2.1.2 The need to differentiate 
Anderson (2006, 7) has stated that “no nation imagines itself as coterminous with 
mankind”. This equals that there ought to be some differentiating elements between 
people or groups of them at least. The purpose on nationalism is thus to find the 
sameness in difference. As with the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights 
of Man it produced, there is talk of universal rights in humankind but it also holds 
the implication that there are other people who do not hold these views and this is 
why we (meaning the French) must distance ourselves, with these identity 
categories of being French, from other identities and nations. There is always a 
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dimension of difference, of exceptionality, hierarchy, ‘us’ versus ‘them’ as in being 
something equals to being somehow better than being something else. These 
boundary formations of inclusion and exclusion are central to nationalism. 
This sort of differentiation can happen through ressentiment where an identity is 
based solely on the notion of resenting some other identity and the will to create a 
new identity via that resentment that we can call ‘schismogenesis’ (Bateson 1972, 
68).  One illustrative example of this is how the newfound American states started 
modifying their lives and e.g. language to differentiate themselves from their former 
British colonial masters. Not only limited to this, the use of ressentiment and 
schismogenesis can lead to conflicts and revolutions in general and also to the 
emergence of nation-states that separate or at least try to secede from an earlier 
political entity. 
A very recent example is the case of Scottish nationalism where ethnic divisions 
within the population are pretty much non-existent and the primary drive for 
independence is to separate the polity of Scotland from the one of the United 
Kingdom and create a new sovereign nation-state. The psychological dimension in 
this context does not necessarily have to have anything to with ethnicity (a term 
discussed next) or the like but only ressentiment and schismogenesis are enough. In 
a similar manner, in the context of Finnish nationalism and Finland’s strive for 
independence in the early 20th century, one frequently used example is the quote 
attributed to the Finnish nationalist Adolf Ivar Arwidsson: "Swedes we are not, 
Russians we do not want to become, let us therefore be Finns." 
As not only limited to external appearances, nationalism in this psychological 
dimension also provides obligations and commitments (Gellner 2006, 1). They can 
even be considered as concrete rules; things to adhere to and live by. It tells people 
what is expected of them if they wish to be a part of this group – the nation. Through 
it, normative statements and claims are made which further proves that always 
linked to this psychological dimension is the element of choice. This is most true with 
symbols of tradition as it is ultimately a choice between which sort of events and 
habits are incorporated into the national canon and which are not. 
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Following Renan (1990, 11), “forgetting, and […] historical error are an essential 
factor in the creation of a nation”, as some things are kept and valorised while others 
are left unrecognised. This is why traditions are the most concrete and dearest to 
nationalists, even if they are invented, or especially because of it (Hobsbawm 1983, 
1). One example is the current situation in Poland where the conservative 
government has made it illegal to acknowledge the involvement of Polish people or 
institutions in the Shoah during the Second World War, which has led to censorship 
in e.g. schoolbooks. Traditions can thus be manipulated to suit better the means of 
the elite and as such offer means of handling the masses or even subdue them which 
leads them to look at these glorified and mythified practices uncritically while 
simultaneously giving legitimacy to them. They function also as a red herring as it 
draws the masses attention away from other possible dealings the ones in power 
might have. 
Somehow, all of these features and symbols matter and therein lies the socio-
constructivist argument: because of an attribute, one can be accused of being more 
(or less) capable of doing or achieving something. This is why the dimension is called 
psychological. Even if the attributes would be more physical by nature, it is the idea 
that these attributes of people matter, and that idea resides in the psychology of 
humans. Like discussed earlier, someone is ‘white’ only because they are not ‘black’ 
or of some other tone. If everyone were of the same skin colour, the issue would not 
even come up as everyone would be unmarked. It is only by the markedness of 
someone or some people that the issues residing inside the psychological start to 
take hold. 
2.2 Deconstructing ethno-symbolism 
The symbols, we have seen, which offer lines of division between identities are very 
salient in the construction of nations, just as ethno-symbolists claim. This does not 
mean, however, that they could not be critically examined as they are inherently 
nothing but choices and means of differentiation, which is done next. We start our 
analysis of these with the concepts of race and ethnicity as they are important to the 
psychological dimension of nationalism in that they offer arbitrary categorisations 
in defining what the appearance of the hypothetical nation is. The two terms are 
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distinct from each other but not without overlapping as the latter can be seen to 
have been derived from the former. Essentially, they are nothing more than just 
tools and instruments in the quest of defining the nation in question. They are 
concepts that offer a base for an identity to attach itself into which, in turn, offers a 
fruitful breeding ground for nationalism to take advantage of and cultivate itself in. 
It is not far-fetched to claim that a majority of nationalism, while not all, have at least 
some ethnic characteristics in them, and thus nationalism and ethnicity can be seen 
as “kindred concepts” (Eriksen 1993, 118). 
2.2.1 Race 
Before moving on to the more contested concept of ethnicity, we start by looking at 
the more ‘concrete’ concept of race, meaning that it offers more clear-cut (while still 
arbitrary) distinctions between groups of people, and is thus very applicable to 
nationalism and its psychological dimension. The racial categorisation and racist 
discourses can be a part of nationalism and most certainly are at least in a right-wing 
context, as they offer hierarchical division between people and groups. For instance, 
the construction of the immigrant as an undesired other has almost always a racial 
basis, undertone or even bias. Spencer and Wollman (2002, 65) have noted how the 
“Australians in the UK, Swiss in France, Austrians in Germany have never been seen 
in the same way as Bangladeshis, Algerians, or Turks”. 
The colour of one’s skin is still only a visual cue of a probable difference although 
the difference is only that colour and nothing else. It does not tell us anything about 
the person themselves and surely nothing about why the difference should even 
matter. The point here for the racists or perhaps populists is to paint a picture of a 
totally different race from the ones they seek to address, while we know that there 
is only one race: the race of humans. By creating these divisions, they seek to 
legitimise hierarchy, of how people should and could be treated in different ways 
just on the basis of their ethnicity. It all adds to the narrative that the right-wing 
populist want to build of a “proper” collective of a nation and the search for racial 
divisions are just tools in trying to accomplish that. 
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Nationalism can have racist elements in it, and it might not even be that rare to see 
it happening, but we must also keep in mind that it is just an element that is chosen 
because the presenter or performer of this sort of nationalism deems it fit and 
assumes it to go well with their target audience. This boils down to the ‘inclusion-
exclusion’ construction that group formations – including nations – have inherent in 
them. This is what Castles (2000, 174) has also acknowledged when he states that 
racism plays “a crucial role in consolidating nation-states by providing an 
instrument for defining belonging or exclusion”. 
Still, we must be aware that there can be nationalism without a racial tang, even if it 
is not that prominent in the current discourse surrounding the phenomenon. For 
instance, Guibernau (1996, 89–90) has suggested that while racism, as it is driven 
by fear and hatred, is destructive, nationalism, on the other hand, is actually 
constructive as it is inspired by feelings such as creativity and even love. This view 
we do not have to wholly accept but it still adds to the claim of this thesis of how the 
complex nature of nationalism allows it to attach to it various sorts of affects, racism 
being only one possible element. 
2.2.2 Religion 
Race offers clear-cut divisions in appearances between groups to base 
differentiation and different treatment with it. In a similar manner, religion does 
exactly this as well. How this kind of racism can be treated as nationalism as well, 
demands deeper inquiry. One way of looking at it comes from a Finnish context, 
where the most prominent right-wing anti-immigration populist Jussi Halla-aho, 
leader of the Finns Party, formerly known as True Finns, has suggested that one 
basis for granting asylum seekers residence would be their religion, namely 
Christian faith. From this it is not difficult to deduce how he wants to differentiate 
the desired immigrants from the undesired ones, them being those coming from the 
Islamic world, whose ethnicity including but not limited to their tone of skin can be 
perceived as threatening to the white European who the populists hold to be the 
normative archetype of a person, the ‘person-to-be’ even. 
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If we look more closely, religion seems to be an intrinsic element for other 
authoritarian nationalist leaders as well. In each of the aforementioned examples, 
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, Russia, and China, religion has been a key factor in 
deciding who and what can constitute as the respective nation. In Hungary, not 
dissimilar from Finnish right-wing discourse, immigration from non-Christian 
countries is framed as a threat to their distinct way of life by Viktor Orbán. In Poland 
the Catholic church holds immense power over the attitudes of the people and which 
the PiS controlled government capitalises on when passing their conservative 
legislation. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transformed the country from 
secular to Islamist. India’s Narendra Modi is a well-known Hindu-centrist who does 
not care much for civil rights of other groups, namely Muslim, just look at what is 
happening in Kashmir. In Russia, Vladimir Putin uses conservative and Orthodox 
values to base policies on, and in China Uyghurs (i.e. Muslims) are sent to 
concentration camps. 
2.2.3 Ethnicity 
The term ‘ethnicity’ emerged in the twentieth century (McCrone, 1998, 22) to 
replace the term ‘race’ so that the different basis for the mistreatment of people or 
groups could now be identified without reproducing them in a normative manner, 
i.e. that these differences were somehow immutable or deeply rooted and thus a 
legitimate basis for inequality (Malik 1996, 91). The point of this new term is to 
transcend the racist logic of ‘there being people who are different because of x, y or 
z, and thus deserve to be treated differently from other groups, usually in a negative 
manner’ to the logic of ethnicity that ‘there are people who are allegedly different 
which can lead to the mistreatment of them’. The term thus acknowledges that the 
normativity presented is based on arbitrary, illogical, and anti-intellectual divisions 
when creating these collectives. 
However, the concept of ethnicity is not without its problems either because no two 
people are alike. So, even this well-meant concept allows for divisions to be made, 
but how big of a hindrance this ultimately is, can be contested because as long as 
there are those that claim these divisions matter, there surely is a way to critically 
point it out, and this is why the concept of ethnicity is useful. People are different 
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and that is what makes us human. Differences in appearances should not matter. 
Still, this has not stopped nationalists, especially ethno-nationalists (hence their 
name), from using ethnicity as a tool in their construction of a collective national 
narrative. Actually, it might have made their overt racism more covert when they 
have adapted their language more ‘politically correct’. 
For ethno-nationalists, the key argument is that national identity has an ethnic basis 
and that ethnicity actually precedes the structuring and development of national 
identity, which leads them to make verbatim the same claims that racists would too, 
namely that differences in ethnicity are basis for different and unequal treatment. 
Fortunately, this drawing from pseudo-biology or -genetics has been rebutted, for 
instance by Chapman (1992, 81–2), when he states it to be “naïve” to think that, at 
least in a European setting, these ‘ethnic’ groups would have any kind of “privileged 
biological connection” as the movement of people for the last 2000 years and well-
before that has made sure of people mixing with each other, and with it their genes 
as well. 
2.2.4 Cultural markers 
In academia, this rebuttal of biology as a central part of ethnicity has led scholars to 
turn to culture in their search for the crux in the concept (Spencer and Wollman 
2002, 66). Stanley Tambiah, an anthropologist, has summarised the view: 
Ethnic identity above all is a collective identity […] It is a self-conscious and 
vocalized identity that substantializes and vocalizes one or more attributes – 
the usual ones being skin colour, language, religion, territorial occupation – 
and attaches them to collectivities as their innate possession and their 
mythico-historic legacy. The central components in this description of identity 
are ideas of inheritance, ancestry and descent, place or territory of origin, and 
the sharing of kinship, any one or combination of which may be invoked as a 
claim according to context and calculation of advantages. These ethnic 
collectivities are believed to be bounded and to be self-producing and 
enduring through time. (1994, 430) 
Even if we were to look at ethnicity not as biological but cultural, and as such as a 
basis for a (national) identity, it inevitably leads us to nevertheless see it as an 
identity construction, something that does not exist outside our society or societies 
without human input. All these traits, were they skin colour, language, religion, 
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ancestry etc. are, in the end, arbitrary. They have no innate property to be treated as 
some all-encompassing truth before which people should just kneel down. It all 
comes down to what sort of elements one chooses to adjoin to one’s consciousness 
of themselves. This element of choice has also been identified and emphasised by 
Barth already as far back as 1969 where he states that the “features that are taken 
into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the 
actors themselves regard as significant” and that “some cultural features are used 
by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some 
relationships radical differences are played down or ignored” (14). 
Smith (1991, 14) is of the mind that different ethnicities or ‘ethnies’ do exist and that 
they can be identified, but only if we remember to look past the racist view of 
biological traits allegedly determining people’s mental attributes, capacities, or 
capabilities. Being an ethno-symbolist, Smith has identified six main attributes 
central to the identification of an ethnic community: 
 a collective proper name; 
 a myth of common ancestry; 
 shared historical memories; 
 one or more differentiating elements of a common culture; 
 an association with a specific ‘homeland’; 
 a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (1991, 21). 
The ethno-symbolist view is most present in these attributes as they have got 
nothing to do with biology but symbols, namely names, myths, and memories. What 
is of utmost importance to note, however, is that while this view moves away from 
the biological and ‘racial’ divisions, i.e. those that have got to do with appearances, 
and towards these wholly cerebral as well as emotive, and as such psychological 
concepts. These are things that occur in people’s minds and hearts, adding to the 
view of nationalism being a most complex phenomenon, because there are myriad 
potential issues which might add to making nationalism seem enticing. This is 
exactly why we must move on from mere descriptive ethno-symbolism to 
explanatory modern social constructivism as it is instrumental that we ask 
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according to who these attributes matter and why they should even matter in the 
first place. 
The appeal of history, especially ‘common’ history, is an important factor to consider 
in observing the overlapping of ethnic and national communities. Still, it is de facto 
not a criterion that can be used to distinguish one group of people from another. To 
claim this is, once again, a choice (Appiah 1991, 51). Take, for instance, those in 
Finland who wear shirts reminding people of the Winter and Continuation Wars of 
1939–1945 and simultaneously wear crest-pendants with the ‘Finnish’ lion on them. 
These are symbolic choices to make in forming one’s identity and to claim them all-
encompassing is a performance which objective is to mould the national identity to 
be as one way and not perhaps some other. Similarly, if one, perhaps a right-wing 
ethno-nationalist, was to claim: “we have always been like this”, ‘we’ being the 
hypothetical national unit with common ancestry, it still remains just an arbitrary 
choice. 
The theme of choice continues here in the manner that someone in a position to do 
so has done it and deems it to matter in a way that precedes many other attributes. 
Nevertheless, it is still only fiction and a narrative that has certain things it wants to 
achieve and has decided that this sort of route is the best to take. This kind of 
reification process must continually be redone and adjusted to be successful and 
echo with the public. Of course, as this putative ‘common’ history is a creation which 
inherently means a process of selection, it is simultaneously entails forgetting as in 
not choosing certain elements deemed unfit to the grand narrative of the history. 
The reification, construction, and reproduction process, of course, is not without 
powerful salience because it does echo with the public. As this reification can lead 
to the indoctrination of its recipients by those producing it, the experience of ethno-
symbolistic symbols, values, and claims can appear to be natural, primordial, and 
even essential by nature (Comaroff 1995, 250). 
Culture is not an unproblematic concept either, nor is it a fixed, static, coherent, or 
harmonious whole. It is fluid, dynamic and thus deeply contested, and in turn is 
under constant negotiation, revision and reinterpretation. It has also much to do 
with power because of its contested nature as people seek to overlook those things 
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in common to them over those they choose to fight over (Eley and Suny 1996, 9). 
For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to say that even if culture is a very complex 
and contested concept, it always has something to do with behaviour and ideals. 
Were they tied to tradition, symbols, language, beliefs, religion etc. is not of much 
importance, when the point is to understand that culture is a way for people to feel 
connected to themselves and to each other as it provides boundaries for patterned 
behaviour of the individual while taking part of a “universe of shared ideals and 
customs” (Keesing 1994, 301). 
Nationalism is very much connected to these processes as creating a distinct culture 
is a very visible demarcation line between collectives. It can be argued that 
nationalism tries to monopolise culture within the collective in order to create a 
‘common’ one which all its members could and should adhere to and accept without 
criticism in a ‘one nation, one culture’ sort of juxtaposition. The stricter this 
definition becomes, the more critical we can be in its examination as the more 
apparent its arbitrariness becomes which can be seen in the popular (or populist) 
conceptions of race, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture in general. They seek 
to take advantage of nationalism by obscuring the fluidity in order to promote 
fixedness and homogenisation of a ‘proper’ culture in the collective. 
2.2.5 Language 
Language can be seen as a key cultural marker or factor when it comes to building a 
national identity and definition of a ‘people’ whether we consider the importance of 
establishing a vernacular (see e.g. Hastings 1997) or it as an enabler of 
communication like Karl W. Deutsch (1966, 96). Granted, it is easier to belong or feel 
belonged if you can talk to the members of your group and share with them 
whatever is on your mind and reciprocate. But by itself it lacks the explanatory 
potential required when it comes to describing nationalism and its power as a sole 
creator of social solidarity and togetherness. It cannot hold under critical 
examination as there are multilingual nations as well. However, this does not mean 
that language is insignificant. We have already touched Gellner’s concept of ‘high’ 
culture in and regarding it, the more the people use (or can be put to use) the same 
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language, the easier it is to disseminate the homogenous culture which in turn 
provides a sense of attachment to the national sentiment. 
A common language certainly helps in the creation and sustenance of the nation-
state with its public administration and mass education, which one objective is to 
reinforce this national sentiment. But, following Kedourie, “there is really no way of 
showing that people who speak one language have to unite into one state” (1967). 
Rather it is the standardisation process under which nationalism subjects the 
language and its vernacular(s) to promote unity and solidarity and thus a sense of 
togetherness that should interest us as critical analysts of the phenomenon. This 
happens primarily through schooling in which certain unified practices and ideas 
could be inculcated in all individuals, and these practices had to be national in 
nature, attaching the individual further into it (Durkheim cited in Mitchell 1931, 
101). 
The Romanticist thinker Johann Gottfried von Herder is one of those early 
proponents of cultural nationalism who equated language with the nation. His belief 
in national cultures being unique and incommensurable, fixed on language, led to 
him define nation’s “tradition, history, religion and principles of life, its whole heart 
and soul” (cited in Ergang 1966, 258). This sort of thinking we can rebut as 
erroneous as nations are not natural, fixed, or unchangeable. It is an inherent 
property of languages to change and nations and states do so alongside it. Even if 
much of human life has developed through these lines does not mean that we can 
infer that it is inevitable to be so. This does not make Herder’s nationalism exclusive 
however, he believes in diversity and pluralism, and most of all the mutual respect 
of nations regarding their own and other’s cultures, and where no one is above the 
other (Özkırımlı 2010, 13). 
*** 
Because of the element of choice inherent with nationalism, what the actual national 
identity turns out to be is constructed in the discursive phenomenon (discussed 
later in Chapter 4) but it is in this psychological dimension that the fuel or the 
building blocks, i.e. the ideas, notions and concepts for such a thing to happen is 
provided. This way Durkheim’s definition of nationality as a “group of human beings, 
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who for ethnical or perhaps merely for historical reasons desire to live under the 
same laws, and to form a single state” (cited in Mitchell 1931, 96) becomes too 
restrictive as it emphasises ethnical (a problematic term as we have established 
already) or historical reasons for nodal points to which people can attach 
themselves while the only thing to consider is that people only have the desire for 
togetherness and for some sort of mutual and collective government. 
Regarding the historical reasons, we can ask who has the power to define us, if not 
us ourselves. The sins of our fathers are not ours and thus neither are their histories, 
even if there were some shared genes. We make our own history and even if we were 
to accept that we are part of a continuum, what has happened before does not tie us 
into following it. The continuum only serves as a vessel to summon inclusion (and 
exclusion with it), used by those in power to do so to gain political goals, in that the 
belief in a common ancestry is actually a consequence of political action and not a 
cause of it (Weber, 1978, 904). This is instrumental to keep in mind when looking 
critically at those processes that construct and maintain national identifications. 
Nationalism can certainly be based on those issues presented by Durkheim but they 
are definitely not a requirement. What we can gather from Durkheim, however, is 
that for this collective identity to be national in nature, it must be politically viable 
in the sense that it must be able to join itself to already existing institutions or even 
create them if they do not exist, which makes nation simply “a politically conscious 
ethnie” (van den Berghe 2001, 273). As this thesis claims, there cannot be 
nationalism without some sort of politics involved, it seems, and what is meant by 




3 A SENSE OF PURPOSE – THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
We now turn to examine what makes the nationalism’s collective(s) political, i.e. 
why it has a political dimensions attached to it. What the political dimension of 
nationalism does, is that it provides the nation with the idea that it comes first and 
it is the only thing which truly matters no matter what. If the psychological 
dimension gives the nation its definition(s) of appearance, whether physical or 
mental, the political dimension provides it with a sense of purpose, as we can only 
talk of nationalism when something is actually done (or at least tried) with it. 
Nationalism thus is not limited only to questions of identity or sentiment even if it 
always is characterised with a sense of solidarity, belonging and togetherness. 
In addition, the psychological dimension has to do with helping to envisage a certain 
group that has the capacity to become national, while the political dimension in turn 
offers the notions, ideas and concepts to help it come to fruition. It answers the 
questions why it matters to be a nation and why even be one in the first place. This 
can be seen for instance in Hroch and how nationalism is “that outlook which gives 
an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests” 
(1993, 6), and in Gellner where nationalism promotes the view that the “obligations 
to the nation override all other public obligations” (2006, 1). 
3.1 Self-government through self-determination 
Following Breuilly, nationalism becomes nationalism only when there is a political 
element involved (1996, 148). It is thus action-based and it is just in these actions, 
which are politically motivated, where nationalism can really be seen in our society. 
Thus, it is not sufficient just to look at different nations through the lenses of e.g. 
culture or ethnicity, but we need look deeper into their nature and the power, the 
potential, capabilities, and capacities they hold. It cannot be overemphasised that 
critical and holistic nationalism studies examine the phenomenon not only as 
something within society to be described but also as a constitutive part of it to be 
explained. The collectiveness, solidarity, togetherness and loyalty has manifested 
itself throughout history in e.g. families, clans, tribes, cities, provinces, or polyglot 
empires and nationalism is only another step in this continuum in expressing human 
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sociality and definitely neither more natural nor more latent than the previous 
incarnations. 
We can now expand an already touched claim of Anderson that a nation “is an 
imagined political community” (2006, 6, emphasis added) and say that an inherent 
part of nationalism is its fixation on politics, in that it has the need, the ability, and 
the potential to draw up and achieve political goals, ultimately meaning the 
formation of a nation-state where the sovereignty is complete and total. From the 
idea of sovereignty, and especially a sovereign people, we can see the link between 
nationalism and democracy. It is the view that a particular people inhabiting a 
particular territory should have the ultimate say in things. Through it, the 
democratic idea of self-government and the nationalistic idea of self-determination 
become connected. 
3.1.1 Democracy and the social contract 
One way of approaching this issue is to define democracy as rights and nationalism 
as national identity. Through these processes it is defined who can rule and what. 
The question becomes then, who are the demos (i.e. the collective) in democracy 
which nationalism offers to answer. It seeks and wants to qualify to whom the rights 
advocated by democracy actually belong. Democracy can this way be seen as 
universalist and inclusive while nationalism is particular and exclusive (Beetham 
and Boyle 1995, 25). But, in contrast to Ringmar where it is claimed that democracy 
clashes with nationalism in their concepts on representation, where the former’s is 
interest is in rights and the latter’s in identity (1998, 545), nowhere is it said that 
nationalism could not be based on rights as well, as it so did during the French 
Revolution, for a time at least. It is when these rights are wanted to be limited to a 
certain part of the population, whether of the world or the territory at question, is 
when nationalism becomes a powerful tool; when someone wants to qualify who is 
to be represented in the first place. In summary, it can be said that nationalism 
serves the people for its needs, while democracy serves the people for their needs. 
Originally, however, the idea of self-determination derives from Immanuel Kant, 
who claimed that morality and knowledge could and should be separated and thus 
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morality was contained and found within the individual themselves and not the 
outside phenomenal world. This led to the evolution of the concept of ‘free will’ 
which ultimately led to self-determination and its becoming the supreme political 
good. Of course, we cannot claim Kant to be a nationalist or even a theorist of 
nationalism but his ideas did contribute significantly to its genesis (Kedourie 1993, 
14–23). 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose was influenced by Kant, took the concept of self-
determination towards the collective and away from the individual. According to 
Rousseau, after people (meaning many individuals) have established and entered 
the social contract between each other which allows them to transcend the ugliness 
of natural life, they are not totally rid of dangers as people could still gang up on each 
other (2001, 75). Rousseau’s solution for this was for people to put the common 
‘general will’ first in favour of their selfish wills as individuals and to instil a sense 
of loyalty and togetherness via the concepts of citizenship (ibid.) and, derived from 
that, patriotism (Barnard 1984, 246). For Rousseau, however, this came to mean 
citizenship in the manner of creating a political collective able to protect people from 
the unstable behaviour of others, and patriotism to evoke a sense of unity which is 
needed for this to be achieved. Now, Kant’s ideas of the autonomy of the individual 
merged with that of the collective which proved to be a fruitful breeding ground to 
nationalism which evoked a shift in thought to occur where the will of the individual 
came to correspond with the one of the nation. 
3.1.2 The French Revolution as the locus classicus 
Empirically speaking this shift has much to do with the French Revolution where the 
despotic rule of the king was overthrown by the people, for the people – even if the 
decision-making apparatus was still far away from the democratic ideals that we 
hold in esteem today. Following Jenkins, the French Revolution can be taken as the 
starting point of nationalism because then “the principle of nationhood emerged 
from a struggle to redefine political sovereignty” (1990, 6). The French Revolution 
sought to enforce the newfound idea of togetherness through shared and equal 
citizenship. Its aim was to politically enfranchise those who were previously 
excluded. While it certainly was not inclusive by modern standards if we think about 
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the situation of groups such as women or slaves, the goal and outcome of it was 
definitely more inclusive than the rule of the Ancien Régime. 
That the revolutionaries wanted to remove the power from the rulers to the ruled 
came to mean the people, which in turn came to be regarded as the nation; consider 
why General François Kellermann exclaimed “Vive la Nation” at Valmy in 1792. At 
that time, the word ‘nation’ came to collect the spontaneous emotions of hope, faith 
and unity which were inspired by the revolution; it equated the nation with the 
whole social organism. The social content of the concept, however, its concretion, 
varied extensively. Even if the joint forces of nationalism and democracy did very 
much in terms of promoting equality, it did little to abolish inequality, and thus the 
‘nation’ came to exclude the popular masses. In fact, it was the bourgeoisie’s 
representatives in the Constituent Assembly who advocated for the equality of 
rights, namely of property, economic freedom, and profit, to counter against 
aristocratic privilege, without taking account the popular classes or even political 
democracy for that matter. It was these masses who had a broader conception of 
what equality of rights ought to mean: the right to existence. Only after some 
struggles was this égalité de jouissance advanced as the bourgeoisie were forced to 
make concessions if they wanted to see a unified nation created. (Soboul 1975, 589) 
As we know, the French Revolution was no bed of roses for the people of France, 
however noble its aspirations were. It has been argued that it came to encounter the 
problems, such as the Reign of Terror, it eventually did because of the antagonistic 
nature of democracy and nationalism, their respective conflict, and that their 
incompatibility was clear from the get-go (Arendt 1966, 230). The argument here is 
that the inclusionary ideal of democracy where those hitherto disenfranchised 
would now be included in political processes did not share the exclusionary 
elements of national awakening. But as the king and the Ancien Régime did not rule 
the whole world but only the territory of France of the time, a nationalistic ideal of 
France and the French was needed as well. This is why we talk of the French 
Revolution. 
A side-effect of this, as we have noticed is the creation, whether conscious or 
unconscious, of the ‘other’, the non-French, the foreigner, with its “psychopolitical” 
47 
 
charge (Brubaker 1992, 47), as a nation is always defined by what it is not via 
inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the nation needs an ‘other’ which is framed 
as a threat to be countered with nationalistic means. One must, of course, be aware 
that neither all of the ‘French’ of the time were revolutionary nor supported the 
revolution. However, it would be fallacious to argue that democracy as it is based on 
ideas of inclusivity or diversity, does not a priori require the existence of a different 
other, one that needs to be excluded and barred, i.e. that it just exists in the world, 
has done so for who knows how long and will continue to do so. The other for 
democracy is of course, the dictator or the authoritarian against whom and whose 
decisions democracy ought to protect. 
Still, the concepts of democracy and nationalism are anything but incompatible as 
they did go, for a time at least, jovially hand in hand. The coinciding interests of them 
led even the esteemed John Stuart Mill to, perhaps not equate, but nevertheless 
parallel the concepts and described their coexistence as harmonious or even co-
dependent: 
a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united 
among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them 
and any others – which make them cooperate with each other more willingly 
than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire 
that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves 
exclusively (2001, 143). 
It was only when the nationalism at question came to be transformed did it also 
transform what it wanted from democracy and only then did the two become 
conflicted and incompatible. Sieyès had the seemingly noble idea of wanting the 
people to be equated with the nation, namely to treat them as synonyms 
(Schwarzmantel 1991, 32). However, his democratic ideals had serious 
qualifications which limited popular sovereignty as he believed in a sort of 
enlightened rule of a publicly spirited elite (Sewell 1988, 121). Robespierre was a 
proponent of more inclusive democracy but even for him ressentiment started to 
wax, illustrated, for instance, in his declaration of how “I hate the English people” 
(cited in Hondt 1995, 225; emphasis added), and in turn democracy waned. 
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3.1.3 Nationalism first 
The aforementioned Romanticist movement developed as an opposing force to 
Enlightenment as it was deemed too cool, calm, and distant with its universalism 
and rationalism. Romanticism, instead, searched for something emotionally 
charged, aesthetic, and cultural that could rouse people’s innermost senses of what 
it means to be a collective. From the Enlightenment nationalism drew its ethos and 
from Romanticism its pathos. How nationalism was able to draw from two 
completely opposite movements and accommodate their views in a way that 
furthers it is a striking example of its adaptive and survivalist nature. 
In this context, the relationship between nationalism and democracy was always 
lopsided to the advantage of the former. Nationalism, in a way, used democracy and 
when it gained enough of a foothold of its own, it discarded democracy and the ideas 
it represented. Nationalism is thus also highly opportunistic by nature. It is 
indiscriminate in its use of complementing ideas, notions, and concepts that advance 
its agenda but shows no loyalty if they start to drag it down. This is not to say that 
democracy did not have its vested interest in the collaboration with nationalism, 
because the creation of nation-states gave birth to and allowed the creation of 
democratic institutions which were to be seen nowhere else (Held 1995, 48). 
This transformation of nationalism allowed for a new expansionist and 
annexationist manifestation to form, one fuelled by hatred towards other nations. 
Against Enlightenment values, the enemy was not anymore the despotic ruler but 
other nations (Spencer and Wollman, 130). The struggle for rights became the 
struggle of nations and precisely in this moment then the paradox, the “double 
standard” (Neuberger 1995, 32), of nationalism is revealed: while nationalism can 
claim to advance the rights of the nation, it sometimes fails (or chooses not to) 
recognise the rights of other nations, especially if they are thought to oppose its own 
interests. This corresponds to what Lord Acton had in mind when he advocated for 
a pluralist state of various nations under one state (2001, 151), although he was a 
prisoner or a product of his time and thus had some serious racist attitudes about 
intellectually superior and inferior races. 
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The point still remains that it is very dangerous to consider the nation and the state 
commensurate which leads to exceptionalism, and changes the dynamic of respect 
for others into disrespect, intolerance, and in the worst case, hate: 
For at the heart of nationalism as a political project, whatever form it takes, is 
a logic that tends towards exclusion. There must after all always be people who 
are not part of the nation; the nation is always framed with the presumption 
of the existence of the outsider, the other, against which the nation is itself 
defined and constructed. (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 96) 
Democracy has no need for nationalism as it can be achieved with people simply 
acknowledging that a certain amount of people inhabit a certain geographical 
location and common rules as a collective must be established for a fruitful existence 
and co-existence. This collectiveness does not however need to be in any way 
nationally based. Similarly, nationalism certainly does not need democracy, but if it 
suits it, it can definitely make use of it. There can even be nationalism without 
democracy, and it might even happen that nationalism turns wholly against it, like 
in the case of Nazi Germany, for instance (Breuilly 1992, 16). A more contemporary 
example, while not as drastic, can be seen once again in the authoritarian regimes 
already discussed where democracy has had to make way for more and more 
powerful nationalisms. In Hungary universities have been forced to move; in Poland 
judiciary systems are going through massive reforms; in Turkey the transparency of 
voting is losing legitimacy; while in India politically motivated violence looms 
strong. 
The clash between self-determination and national self-determination can be seen 
in already existing nation-states with secessionist movements. The competing 
agendas of being sovereign and having the right to form a nation-state in the first 
place even in the territory of an existing nation-state, is about power. The goal is to 
overthrow the old rule in place of the new ‘better’ one, but even it has to be defined 
or else the identity remains unresolved and the nation is not born anew. It was these 
coinciding interests of democracy and nationalism and thus their compatibility that 
paved the way for other national liberation struggles such as those that emanated 
from post-colonialism (Jenkins 1990, 8; Alter 1989, 143–144), in addition to the fall 
of the Soviet Union (see e.g. studies done by Diuk and Karatnycky 1993; Karklins 
1994; Senn 1995; and Taageperra 1993). The trend is by no means diminishing as 
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already in Europe with Scotland and Catalonia there are nationalist movements 
which seek sovereignty via more or less democratic arguments. 
3.2 State as the ultimate provider of community and sovereignty 
The concept of ‘state’ has proven itself to be an intricate part of nationalism. 
Continuing with our claim of modernity, a new political form of the state emerged 
in Europe somewhere in the sixteenth century and the couple centuries after that 
(Mann 1992, 150). It is novel compared to pre-modern polities because now the 
state had grown in size and relevance exponentially in relation to society. This lead 
to competition between states which in turn further accelerated their advance, 
development and progress. In addition, internal pacification of the territories was 
also required and for two reasons: so that the new states could have a monopoly 
over violence in their territory, which leads to the second reason where this 
monopoly of violence could be directed against external threats as well, i.e. primarily 
by levying armies. Larger states had more inhabitants which meant that more 
sophisticated means of promoting community were needed which eventually 
formed to be national by nature. 
The psychological dimension had to do with the choice and competition between 
ethnic ties and symbols that have the potential to create them. But nationalism is 
not only competition between ethnic lines and their symbols and traditions etc. but 
between polities as well, namely states and even factions within them. According to 
Gellner “the nation and the state should be congruent” (2006, 1) and this is what 
defines nationalism and distinguishes it from other, less demanding forms of group 
identification (Hobsbawm 1992, 9). States are the territories where a single polity, 
no matter its genealogy, has the ability and capacity to make decisions regarding the 
inhabitants of its territory. In the western world this is mostly seen through a 
government that has been selected through a process of democratic 
parliamentarism which is supposed to give the power to decide to the people but 
which can be contested. But according to nationalism, rule of the people by the 
people in sovereign states equals the rule of the nation by the nation in nation-states. 
This stems from the desire to have something to control, or only to have something, 
period, without outside influence or dictation. 
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3.2.1 Forming congruence through established institutions 
According to Max Weber the term ‘nation’ is ambiguous due to its complex nature 
not just in “terms of empirical qualities” but a “sentiment of solidarity in the face of 
other groups” as well (2000, 5). Weber continues that this solidarity manifests itself 
as “a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (2000, 9). The 
word “normally” here is of importance, as it acknowledges that the state is not 
necessarily the one thing that all nations desire or must desire, because alternatives 
do exist. Nations do not necessarily have to even create a new state for their own as 
they might just seek to subject an already established one to its will. 
For Carr though, the ultimate result of nationalism on a global scale is apparent as it 
claims to make the nation “the sole rightful sovereign repository of political power 
and the ultimate constituent unit of world organization” (1945, 39). A nation is thus 
a collective with a political agenda which certainly manifests ultimately in the desire 
to create its own sovereign state where the will of it could be found and advanced 
thus leading to complete self-determination without outside meddling. But it does 
not limit itself only to this goal as there can be many other aspirations in addition to 
the yearning for a state of its own. 
It is important to note that we cannot always equate the nation with the state as 
there are nations without their own sovereign territories, e.g. the Scots, Catalans or 
the Kurds just to name a few. Also, there are nations that do not, actively at least, 
seek a sovereign territory to control but even some sort of decision-making 
mechanism where they could control the route their nation is heading such as the 
Sámi. The ability to decide is the crux and it is most executable within a sovereign 
territory, i.e. the state, which makes it easy to understand why it is such an integral 
concept regarding nationalism. 
Not all nationalist movements want to have total control of the state, but can be 
content to even be able to influence the state they inhabit according to their wants 
and needs. Continuing with our example of the Sámi people, who for instance in 
Finland have their own representative body, the Sámi Parliament, through which 
they make their voices heard on issues of e.g. culture or language without at least a 
passionate desire to create a state of their own. This just goes to show that while not 
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all nations without states are inherently secessionist or separatist by nature, what 
is common to them all is the need for acknowledgment by the state they inhabit, as 
a separate polity, with its own characteristics different from the larger populus. 
The inherent element of choice of nationalism still remains present here as well. 
Gellner has put this well with his statement of how “nationalism is a phenomenon of 
Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft” (2006, 74). Whether or not we agree 
that the nation-state is a bourgeois formation we can surely agree with Rosa 
Luxemburg in the notion that “the nation as a homogenous sociopolitical entity does 
not exist” (cited in Forman 1998, 89). This is echoed in Bauer where the claim that 
national character is not absolute but rather “relative commonality of traits in the 
mode of behaviour of particular individuals” (1996, 41) grounds us once again 
towards the sense of togetherness and cohesion of the collective and the using any 
means necessary to attain and sustain it. 
3.2.2 Spreading cultural information 
While the polity of the state was already forming and in some instances formed 
when nations started attaining consciousness, it was precisely these nations that 
appropriated this suitable political form for their own use. States preceded 
nationalism yes, but that only means that nationalism truly is a modern 
phenomenon because states are modern as well. When these modern quasi-
democratic states did emerge, they did so in national lines thus creating the polities 
we now call nation-states. It was nationalism which introduced the idea that an 
institution where the nation can survive and strive must be or be established. This 
answers the issue of why and how did the state form along national lines in contrast 
to some other, thus creating the nation-states. 
First the states and their respective territories were formed which the nation then 
saw as a medium through which human progress and civilization is best achieved 
(Hayes 1931, 302). The states were already formed, but with their vacuous and 
lacklustre government, a space emerged that nationalism saw an opportunity to fill. 
Thus we can recognise that states did come first and nations after, or as Wallerstein 
puts it, “in almost every case statehood preceded nationhood, and not the other way 
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around, despite a widespread myth to the contrary” (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991, 
81). By no means, this is to say that states created nations, only that states offered a 
well-established institution, mainly with its territory and polity that the nations saw 
and thought could be taken advantage of. 
We already touched the key issue of information and communication earlier but 
Mann (1992, 150–1) drives the point home when he states that while “nationalism 
is an elaborated ideology shared by many people right across a territory” to spread 
it needs to be “organized through specific channels of communication”. The nation-
state had the capacity to disseminate its prescribed ideology/information/culture 
to its inhabitants and like a lightning following the path of least resistance, the least 
resistance for ideology was through ethnic lines e.g. a common vernacular or some 
other distinct cultural trait. 
This had the crucial political implications of mobilising greater number of men for 
war, because the greater the armies, the greater the odds for success. This led to a 
circle where the more men were mobilised, the more they needed explanation for 
their sacrifice, and when the explanation was more nationalism, which offered more 
unity against a ‘common’ threat, the more aware the subjects became of “their 
membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such 
membership might confer” (Held 1995, 57). This corresponds with Kohn and how 
nationalism is the integration of masses into a political form (1958, 4). 
As these nation-states of auld became more and more democratic, the 
heterogeneous elite fractions vying for power needed to connect with its other 
inhabitants with increased measures. This competition between the fractions only 
fortified the young, tentative nation-states to the point where they became strong 
enough, that the struggle for internal power superseded the desire for external 
power between states. In that way, things have not changed in the few last centuries, 
where if one were to want to become a player in the world-stage, they need first the 
support of their nation. According to Bauman, the nation-state is “the idea of a nation 
made into the state’s flesh” (1997, 190) and this analogy is what the nationalists 
seek to take advantage of. 
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The objectives that nationalists have in their quest for power can vary and Breuilly 
(1993, 9) has identified three such movements: reform nationalism, that aims to gain 
control of already existing states, for instance, pretty much any political party in any 
country that identifies itself as nationalist; unification nationalism that seeks to 
expand an already existing state such as Russia’s nostalgic desire to become an 
imperial power once more, concretised in the ventures it has done for instance on 
Ukrainian soil; and separatist nationalism which aims to split the state in order to 
create a new state, e.g. the already touched Scottish and Catalonian secessionist 
movements. What these movements all have in common is their dependence on the 
already established institutions of the state, which adds to the argument of the 
instrumentality of the state as a key element in nationalism which functions as the 
means for conveying the power pursued by the nationalists. It is the state that 
nationalism wants, not the nation per se, as it can already be seen as a given. It is the 
action that is wanted to be done in the name of the nation that grants nationalism 
its political dimension. 
3.2.3 Citizenship and the right to have rights 
The state enables the nation the means to define inclusion as well as inclusion with 
the concept of citizenship and with it nationality. The only way for you to be a Finn, 
for instance, is that you are acknowledged by the state-apparatus of Finland. It is not 
a right one has de facto by simply existing unless certain criteria are met. How this 
acknowledging is done varies between states as well as within them, the three main 
instruments being by blood (ius sanguinis), by being born in the state (ius soli), and 
naturalisation. The two first mentioned notions open up a debate for two different 
nationalisms and their implications. With ius soli the nationalism in question can be 
considered more inclusive and ‘civic’ as it welcomes to its nation all those born 
within its territory, in contrast to ius sanguinis which is more exclusive and ‘cultural’ 
with its advocacy of blood relations. Ius sanguinis is more of a rule while ius soli is 
an additional way of conferring citizenship (Mertes 1996, 27). 
For instance, in Finland which does not ascribe to ius soli like e.g. the United States 
does, if you are born to a Finnish mother, you automatically are entitled to a Finnish 
citizenship. Otherwise, certain requirements are needed. Passing on a citizenship 
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through paternal ties requires often marriage or official establishing of paternity. Ius 
soli, seemingly being more open, is not without its qualifications, however. It is 
ascribed as the state wants to impose responsibilities to the individual, as it is likely 
while not inevitable, that a person born in the state will also continue living there. It 
is a means of drawing loyalty from the subject, and adherence mostly to its 
monopoly of violence (Weber 1946, 78). Also in common for both of these 
instruments is that they are mostly juridical by nature and do not reveal much about 
the nations themselves. In both cases, the nation into which membership is 
conferred, is treated as a given. 
Naturalisation, on the other hand, requires a certain assimilation to the dominant, 
given, national culture. It prescribes that one has to be or become ‘something’ in 
order to attain citizenship and thus membership of the nation. For instance, the 
Finnish Immigration Service provides a list of six requirements for an acceptable 
naturalisation to occur to an applicant: 
 established identity; 
 sufficient language skills; 
 sufficient period of residence; 
 integrity; 
 means of support; 
 fulfilled payment obligations (2019). 
As one can see, these requirements are very arbitrary and indefinite. Terms such as 
‘established’ and ‘sufficient’ are not unproblematic. Most revealing is the mention of 
‘identity’ which implies that there would be a certain kind of Finnishness which one 
needs to acquire. But as this thesis handles with conceptual theorisation about 
nationalism and not critiquing Finnish immigration policies, we will not delve 
further into this matter. This was just to show the problems one might encounter 
when dealing with the phenomenon in the framework presented as the conferring 
of citizenship is an excellent example of the psychological and political dimensions 
working together in the discourse dimensions as it draws from both dimensions, 
psychological in the identity building sense and political in the acknowledgment of 
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citizenship, in a predetermined environment which is decided in the discourse of 




4 THE POTENTIAL REALISED – THE DISCURSIVE DIMENSION 
Now that we have established how nationalism has very much something to do a 
political collective, we still need to examine just how this political collective is 
actually formed. The upcoming sections will show how nationalism as a 
phenomenon happens and is done and performed discursively and in discourses, 
which leads us to claim that the formation happens in a discursive dimension. We 
can thus delve into the crux of the phenomenon, of how nationalism is actually used 
and to what effect, because as we have established, nationalism is not nationalism 
yet unless something is actually done with it. A connection between the analytical 
and the practical is thus required. In addition, as no two manifestations of 
nationalism either are or can be exactly the same, this level of practicality enables 
us to look at the many diverse nationalisms of how they are performed and 
produced in concrete terms and this is ultimately done via discourse. 
4.1 Nationalism as a discursive formation 
We can identify the third dimension of nationalism as discursive as it allows us to 
answer the questions proposed, for instance, by Day and Thompson of “how, from 
what, by whom and for what” nationalism is constructed (2004, 107). In the 
discursive dimension is where the “discursive formation” advocated by Craig 
Calhoun (1997, 3) of nationalism is constituted. By looking nationalism as an 
arbitrary formation, it enables us as analysts to maintain our sense of critique 
without sacrificing objectivity, so that we do not add to the unnecessary reification 
of the phenomenon. 
The two dimensions of nationalism already discussed basically feed the 
phenomenon with their respective ideas, notions and concepts, and it is in the third, 
discursive dimension where it is decided which of these notions are viable to form 
a successful compilation and then become integrated to the nationalism proper (see 
Figure 1). It is the melting pot of ideas, constantly tempered and reorganised. The 
discursive dimension is thus aimed at solving the problems and achieving the goals 
the two other dimensions create. It answers the question of ‘how’, as in how to 
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advocate for this particular nationalism in the best way possible to reach the goals 
and solve the problems that come up. 
In addition, the discursive dimension also functions as a mediator between the 
dimensions and also is the dimension that offers the solutions found to the public 
arena through discourse, hence the name of it. Essentially, nationalism ultimately 
happens in the discursive dimension because it is the only dimension that has a 
direct connection to the public arena, with which to affect and influence people as 
well as their cognition and consciousness. Following Foucault, discourse comes to 
mean all the “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” 
(2002, 54) and not just spoken utterances or written words but also pretty much 
every semiotic mean of conveying information. 
Continuing with Calhoun, he has identified ten distinguishing features present in 
nationalist discourse: 
1. boundaries, of territory and population, or both; 
2. indivisibility; 
3. sovereignty, or the aspiration to sovereignty, usually through an 
autonomous and putatively self-sufficient state; 
4. an ‘ascending’ notion of legitimacy, or the idea that government is just only 
when supported by popular will; 
5. popular participation in collective affairs; 
6. direct membership, where each individual is a part of the nation and 
categorically equivalent to other members; 
7. culture which involves some combination of language, shared beliefs and 
values; 
8. temporal depth, the idea of a nation extending from the past to the future; 
9. common descent or racial characteristics; 
10. special historical, sometimes sacred, relations to a particular territory 
(1997, 4–5). 
We have already touched all of the issues on this list in some form or another which 
just goes to show that we are definitely on the right track in our analysis, that the 
analytical potential can and will actualise in the ‘real world’. The list is thus an 
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amalgam of the issues we considered in the previous dimensions and in the 
discursive one we can now see them being realised. The list is by no means 
exhaustive, so far as that all of these notions presented must be found to be able to 
identify discourse as nationalistic, rather they are more general focal points through 
which to look at the issue as it is very difficult to think about nationalist 
argumentation if it did not contain at least some of the features mentioned. 
However, it is worth keeping in mind that these are not definitive features, but 
rather claims that are incorporated into nationalistic argumentation because 
“nations are constituted by the claims themselves” (Calhoun 1997, 5). 
4.1.1 Discourse and nationalism as co-constitutive 
The discursive dimension takes into account the issues close to the nationalism at 
hand, i.e. those that come up in the psychological and political dimensions. This goes 
to show that even if nationalism is first and foremost political by nature, it is not only 
that, and as such cannot be considered merely a doctrine, contra Kedourie and 
Gellner. This way we are able to incorporate into our analysis all the more basic 
ways nationalism affects our talking, acting, thinking, and cognition. It is the 
discourse of nationalism that “takes pre-existing [psychological] attachments and 
gives them political significance” (Özkırımlı 2010, 202) which is then projected to 
the public. It also takes into account the process of selection which is crucial and 
inherent to nationalism as it is in the discursive dimension where the ultimate 
choices about the collective are done. Considering how we have already addressed 
the issue that to recognise a nation, a sense of social solidarity is required, it is 
however not enough to constitute a nation as an absolute, because solidarity, 
togetherness etc. exists in many other sorts of groupings as well. In almost all that 
require even some kind of cooperation, to be frank. Nationalism and especially the 
discourse of it is thus to think about social solidarity in a particular way. 
At this juncture we can look at the so far neglected but central notion of patriotism 
which can be seen as a kind of ‘benevolent nationalism’. In fact, ardent nationalists 
often frame themselves as patriots who cherish, value and, if necessary, defend their 
respective nation. Towards those who view nationalism as something to criticise, 
they might ask what is so wrong with patriotism or being patriotic. Consequently, 
60 
 
we could answer that nothing by itself if you accept that being patriotic you are also 
de facto a nationalist and must thus give reasons to why you think your nation(ality) 
is such a wonderful thing. 
Continuing with Durkheim, patriotism has to do with how an individual considers 
itself bound to the state via “ideas and feelings […] seen from a certain viewpoint […] 
from the affective angle” (1986, 202; emphasis added). From this viewpoint, we can 
consider patriotism as an illusion or a mirage, only showing that nationalism has 
succeeded in its hegemonic endeavour to take unflinchingly at face-value that what 
it in its endless benevolence deems worthy to offer. Illustratively this led Durkheim, 
writing in the age of the Russian Empire, to contemplate if “Russian patriotism exists 
among the Finns” even if Finland is a part of the Russian state (ibid.). We can thus 
say that essentially, the viewpoint is the discourse of nationalism, patriotism being 
just one manifestation of it. 
National identity, whether or not benevolent, is a construct and it is discourse which 
constructs it. The political dimension offers and creates the actions wanted for the 
nationalist movements and again it is in the discursive dimension where they are 
ultimately done and made. Breuilly has identified three tactics that are required for 
a nationalist movement to succeed in their task whatever it might be: 
Co-ordination is the part ideology plays in bringing a set of diverse political 
interests into a single movement by providing them with a unity of values and 
purposes. Mobilization is the part ideology plays in bringing new groups into 
the political process and providing them with political objectives and 
justifications. Legitimation is the part ideology plays in presenting an 
acceptable image of a political movement to outsiders. (1992, 93; emphasis 
added) 
Quite frankly, these tactics can be said to apply to any political movement 
whatsoever, but that only adds to the claim of this thesis that nationalism is certainly 
a political endeavour and thus must be considered as such, which in turn allows for 
more rigid and critical analysis and discussion like with any other political 
phenomenon. It also adds to the discursive element of politics as the point lies in the 
treatment of nationalism as an ideology and as such it can be examined 
dispassionately, objectively and without bias. The ideological is an intrinsic part of 
the political which is actualised in the discursive dimension. 
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4.2 The power of producing and performing nationalism 
The discursive dimension is also intrinsically linked to power, as it is those with a 
status of power that are able to direct the discourse, namely the elite in one form or 
another. Brass has also identified this when he states that: 
ethnicity and nationalism are not ‘givens’ but are social and political 
constructions. They are creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and 
sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of groups they wish to 
represent in order to protect their well being [sic] or existence or to gain 
political and economic advantage for their groups as well as themselves. 
(1991, 8) 
Here we see the already established modernist view in play where both ethnicity 
and nationalism are not seen as something natural or “given”. Rather, they are social 
creations and constructions which inherently involves the element of choice and 
this choosing is done via the elites in powerful positions to do so. That is why we 
look at e.g. Orbán, Erdoğan and Modi when we want to find out the currents in 
nationalist populism because they are the representatives of the elite. They are the 
ones who have the power to set agendas and thus control the issues to be discussed. 
They are among the ones currently controlling the discourse and presenting the 
narrative. 
Kedourie (1993, 141) states that “it is very often truer to say that national identity 
is the creation of a nationalist doctrine than that nationalist doctrine is the 
emanation of or expression of national identity”. We can see the connection to 
Gellner in that it is nationalism that creates nations and not vice versa. A national 
identity is thus always constructed by those with the capacity, ability and power to 
do so and that is always done through discourse and that is why the discursive 
dimension is the key place to study when examining the use of nationalism as means 
to influence people’s cognition. 
It must be noted that nationalism is not an actor in itself but it offers a script for the 
actors to follow and the actors are more often than not political by nature. Or are the 
political actors the screenwriters who draw from nationalism as they wish? 
Politicians, intellectuals, writers, historians, academics and such make their own 
choices which are then used by the political actors who make their own choices for 
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policies which then offer new grounds for research and thinking and so the pattern 
continues. 
The choice how nationalism is portrayed, advocated or argued for is always 
arbitrary. There is no absolute or unquestionable truth about why nationalism 
should be portrayed along ethnic lines, it just so happens to be the case in a historical 
context. But, as Brass suggests, “the process of ethnic identity formation and its 
transformation into nationalism is reversible” (1991, 16). The world and society are 
in a constant state of flux and the changing political and economic circumstances 
could lead to a wholly other emphasis entirely from the “symbolic manipulation of 
cultural forms, values and practices” (ibid.). Again we can turn to the case of Scottish 
independence and its referendum of 2014, where both sides for and against 
independence argued solely via socio-economic arguments e.g. currency and 
weapons of mass destruction, without mentioning anything even resembling 
ethnicity related issues, further solidifying nationalism as not merely ethnic but 
much more than that. Ethnicity is just one side of the coin because the agenda can 
be set along other lines as well, but the agenda is always set in the discourse. 
How these choices regarding agenda are then made is another question to think 
about. The lightning metaphor previously used of the path of least resistance applies 
here as well. As society is not a vacuum but a complex network of things, the elite 
are not disconnected from it either. They choose the best options that forward their 
agenda or in other words, those that can be manipulated to maximum effect. The 
elites are constrained by the properties already existing and visible in the group but 
they are nevertheless able to modify, simplify and manipulate those properties how 
they see fit to further their agenda in a politically useful manner (Brass 1991, 16). 
The thing to keep in mind is that the nation, like class, religion, gender, or race, is a 
system of control, meant to offer divisions through collectiveness. It thus has a 
manipulative side to it which must be critically looked at in order to find out what 
exactly is attempted to get done or achieved with this very sort of argumentation, 
because it is in and through argumentation where nationalism is performed, created 
and maintained, in addition to the power structures that are caused by it. It is a 
constant process of selection and de-selection over what matters, what counts as 
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significant, as well as enforcement, prohibition, and injunctions against alternates. 
Due to the infinite amount of possible constructions it can be moulded to suit a 
myriad of purposes. Only when these notions, ideas and concepts of nationalism are 
deemed to matter, can it have the power it ultimately has as nationalism definitely 
has historically resonated with much of the global population and continues to do 
so. 
4.2.1 The narrative formed 
The incorporation of the discursive element to the holistic treatment of the socially 
constructed phenomenon of nationalism sets the stage for more postmodern 
handling of the subject, transcending the need to not only justify historically why 
nationalism is what it is, but to also include with it a critical element in examining 
and scrutinising the discourse that goes along with it. In the words of Bhabha, the 
nationalists’ objective is the production of “the idea of the nation as a continuous 
narrative national progress” (1990, 3). With the choices that nationalists have in 
creating this discourse of the nation, they are in fact creating a narrative, a story if 
you will, meant to influence and ultimately manipulate people to support their 
invented doctrine, not unlike any other ideology. But it is nationalist as it is about 
forming a political collective via the ideas and notions stemming from the other 
dimensions we have discussed. When creating the narrative of the nation, the 
process of choosing the right ideas, notions and concepts is a totally arbitrary and 
“not an automatic, spontaneous or organic process” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 
57). 
Hall (1992, 273) has identified many discursive strategies that the nationalist 
project applies in its endeavour for power. The ones most salient for this thesis are 
the one in which how the story of the nation is told in history books and in popular 
culture in general. Another is the emphasis on origins, tradition and continuity in 
order to portray the nation as something unchanged and unchanging, thus adding 
to the view of ‘one true nation’. The point of these strategies is to offer people 
simplifications and reductions of impossibly complex issues so that they would have 
no problem in accepting them. 
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In addition, their goal is not just to make people accept them but to make people 
want to accept them. It can be portrayed as a big stream where everyone (who can 
be considered to be one of the nation of course) can throw their canoe in and just go 
with the flow. The power and effectiveness of these strategies cannot be disputed 
but they still are very problematic. In emphasising one notion or symbol, the 
nationalist doctrine represses and obscures other notions and symbols that to some 
might be as vital as the ones chosen by the elite in the effort to construct unity of the 
nation, which in the end is “impossible” because of just this (Bhabha 1990, 3). 
We have acknowledged earlier how the dissemination of information is vital to the 
spread of nationalism but then the discussion revolved then much around the part 
of the state as a central feature for this, but now we can see that the nationalists do 
not need the state for their propaganda. Still, they do compete for the control of the 
state and its information spreading machine and capabilities which adds to the 





5 DISCUSSION – FROM PLURALISM TO MONISM 
Now that we have identified the three dimensions of nationalism and the ideas, 
notions and concepts they entail, we can move on to examine more closely their 
relationships between each other and how that in turn affects and constitutes the 
phenomenon of nationalism itself. The three dimensions of nationalism are 
inextricably linked in that we cannot talk of nationalism as such with even one of the 
dimensions absent. This is why none of the dimensions cannot be overlooked or 
understated. They must be viewed holistically and constitutionally in order to grasp 
the fundamentals regarding the phenomenon. All of the dimensions are required for 
a holistic treatment of the phenomenon, even if the emphasis can vary between how 
deeply dimensions are looked at or how prominent the dimensions even are in a 
certain nationalism. 
The psychological dimension is required to tell us the appearance of the nation 
under discussion, whatever that might be, based on ethnicity or something totally 
else. The political dimension provides legitimacy and orientation for the nation to 
draw up goals and achieve them. The discursive dimension compiles and sifts the 
ideas, concepts, and notions stemming from the two other dimensions and creates a 
narrative that can be presented to the public who then can accept or reject the 
nationalism provided for them. The dimensions and their relationships are 
presented in Figure 1. 
5.1 The relationships of the dimensions examined 
As stated, all of the dimensions have their respective roles to play in the process of 
producing nationalism. They are linked to each other as all of them are required for 
us to be able to identify nationalism as well as study it. An interesting thing to point 
out is that while the idea-dimensions of the psychological and the political are not 
directly connected to each other, they are connected to their respective nationalism. 
They are part of the same process while having their own contents independent 
from each other and thus their relationship is more of an indirect nature. The 
psychological dimension has no inherent need to transmit its ideas and notions to 
the political dimension directly while it can certainly draw from it via the discursive 
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dimension. Likewise, the political dimension has no de facto requirements to draw 
from the fountain of the psychological dimension while it surely can be very effective 
to do that but this as well is done via the discursive dimension where it is ultimately 
decided what matters. The political dimension has no direct connection with or to 
the psychological as politics being the art of the possible, and the psychological has 
no inherent need to think about actions because being is what it is all about. 
An example of the absent direct connection between the psychological and political 
dimension and the role of the discursive dimension as a mediator between them can 
be seen in the much used anti-immigration slogan used in Finland “Suomi 
suomalaisille” which freely translates to “Finland to the Finns”. Already in this one 
little extract we can see all of the dimensions working, separately and together. We 
can see the psychological dimension in the group ‘Finns’, the political dimension in 
the objective that to this group of ‘Finns’ the state of Finland belongs to and to no 
one else for that matter, and this is all represented and compiled in the discursive 
dimension where slogan is ultimately uttered, with the goal to influence the public 
opinion in the public arena. 
Of course, it is important to note that the public arena is not one homogeneous mass 
where everyone either accepts or rejects the narrative presented to them, but that 
it is made up of different people with different opinions. Through these opinions the 
acceptability or rejection of the narrative is fed back to the discursive dimension and 
through this feedback new or overlooked ideas can make their way even further 
back into the two farther idea-dimensions where they might once have been 
marginalised. In doing so, they can with hypothetical newfound ethos and pathos 
make their way to become more central in the next version of the narrative of the 
nation. Just like in Christopher Nolan’s movie Inception of 2011, if an idea is planted 
in the right way it can grow to become an all-encompassing compulsion that affects 
the soul and shakes the core. In this manner, it is possible that at first a marginal 
notion or idea can come to play a larger role in the narrative through events or mere 
re-iteration that can make it more and more legitimate. 
Like with all political movements, nationalists do not need to assure every single 
individual in the public arena of their cause but just enough to help them in 
67 
 
advancing their search for power suffices. Other ideologies are vying for people’s 
acknowledgement in the public arena as well because politics is about competing 
for people’s cognition and ultimately submission to the doctrine presented. The two-
way arrows in Figure 1 highlight this interconnectedness of the elements in 
question. The public arena also feeds back to the nationalism presented to it what it 
is willing to accept and what not and what kind of ideas it wants in the first place. 
The nationalist doctrine will then accordingly make the accompanying adjustments 
to their narrative, drawing from the psychological and political concepts and notions 
that the two respective dimensions have to offer. The position of the discursive 
dimension in between of the public arena and the other two dimensions, rather than 
being level with them, highlights its role as the sole entity which communicates 
between the dimensions and the public arena. The spherical form of the dimensions 
highlights the fact of them being the dimensions of nationalism, while the 
rectangular shape of the public arena functions to illustrate the notion that it is 
influenced by it as well as influences it and not a part it. 
An illustrative way of looking at the dimensions is to draw a comparison with the 
human body. The psychological dimension is the nervous system which thinks and 
feels. The political dimension is the muscles and bones, the things that make us able 
to move and act and thus reach our goals. The discursive dimension, then, is our 
communication organs, those things which make us human, as it is only through 
communication that we are able to reach cooperation in the scale that we as humans 
can achieve the things we have, for instance democracy, intricate infrastructural 
developments and other components necessary for civilisations to flourish. 
Together the dimensions create the whole of the phenomenon as they are co-
constitutive – they constantly affect and transform each other. 
5.2 National awakening 
The psychological and political dimensions may not be directly connected but their 
intricate relationship and dependence on each other in making up the whole of 
nationalism is nevertheless of utmost importance. This is most evident in the 
process of how a more general identity or sentiment develops into nationalism. This 
happens when the identity of the group and its ideal view of how its surroundings 
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ought to be do not correlate with each other. So something must be done about the 
issue in order to fix it or at least move closer to a more acceptable situation. This in 
turn means that some sort of awareness of one’s position in the world and also of 
one’s agency in it is required, as the next part of the process is the implementation 
of nationalist claims to the picture. 
This means that there must be some sort of cognitive basis for the acknowledgement 
of nationalism as something that can improve the situation. So, in a way, the process 
of how an identity develops into nationalism can be traced to the psychological 
dimension gathering basis for its being the way it is from the political dimension 
that can aid in making the non-ideal more ideal. However, it is important to notice 
that this realisation happens through the discursive dimensions as it is the 
arguments that ultimately have the capability to implement this change in the 
situation. This process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. The development of identity to nationalism. 
The psychological dimension offers the choice of being a certain kind of a collective 
while the political dimension offers it the choice of what is to be done about it. The 
ultimate decision to actualise these choices and potential is then done in the 
discursive dimension. To each dimension thus is incorporated the element of choice, 
which adds to the modernist view. Because if it were natural or given like 
primordialists or perennialists claim, there would be no need for a choice, which 
would devoid the whole phenomenon of its analytic potential while the opposite is 
true. We can surely say that nationalism if something has a whole lot of analytic 
potential, or why else would it be on constant display and under rigid and heated 
discussion. 
Now that we have established that nationalism is political, action-based and goal-
oriented in nature, we are faced with the question of from where do these notions 
stem. The answer resides in the dissatisfaction of how things currently are. This 
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dissatisfaction then is seen to be able to be resolved best via arguments that have to 
do with forwarding the nationalist agenda to improve the current situation. This 
answers how the nationalists not in power see things but what about the nationalist 
already in power. How are they dissatisfied? This can be answered through their 
means of trying to maintain their positions in power as they must constantly repeat 
and renew their arguments, were they concerned with e.g. foreigners or their 
opponents’ views, in other words the nationalists’ dissatisfaction in this way is the 
dissatisfaction towards their opponents’ dissatisfaction towards them. 
5.3 Pluralism and monism converging 
The three-dimensional model presented in this thesis illustrates how different 
manifestations of nationalism are produced. This is not to say that this model 
functions as some sort of apparatus through which a single, fixed nationalism is 
always given. It is the production process that is common to them all while the 
outcomes differ from each other. The two idea-dimensions of psychological and 
political offer an infinite amount of possibilities of how to perceive a nation and its 
goals and the discursive dimension then compiles and compresses the ideas, notions 
and concepts it wants into nationalism. Seen this way, we can argue that through 
nationalism pluralism and monism converge. 
The difference between monism and pluralism is that the former seeks to find the 
one true system of good living while the latter aims to make one, holding that there 
can be many different ways of doing this. Pluralism seeks to take into account each 
and every individual’s wants and needs while monism aims to define what every 
single individual ought to want and need. Both of these views are apparent in 
nationalism as it aims to make a single collective amalgam of values, interests and 
morals worth pursuing out of myriads of possibilities. In other words, nationalism, 
or should we say nationalisms, try to impose upon us certain normative ways of how 
to live a politically good life. 
As there are many notions of good, were it living in general or organising society, 
nationalism gradually moves towards monism from pluralism in its quest to find the 
best possible alternative. This begs the question, the best for who exactly. The 
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answer is for the nation at hand, of course, other competing groups or collectives 
are irrelevant. As it can draw from such a vast pool of possible inputs, nationalism 
can be used for pretty much anything from justifying genocides to interventionist 
military campaigns. This high malleability of nationalism means that it is used by 
those with something to gain in summoning support for their objectives. As such it 
is not enough to just question the nationalism used but also what is attempted to be 
gained by using it because nationalism can be accommodated with pretty much 
every political ideology were it liberalism or totalitarianism, democracy or 
dictatorship and anything in between. 
It must be noted that also pluralism, in concurrence with monism, acknowledges the 
necessity of imposing limits as not every possibility can be reasonable or desired. 
Monism just takes this limiting further than pluralism. In the centre of it all is the 
question of what is valued over what else and why. This inevitably leads to 
hierarchical divisions being made between groups of people and that is what 
nationalism pretty much is about, advancing one collective over others. Thus 
nationalism seeks to limit our understanding of the human condition which makes 
it such a dangerous tool if left unchecked without criticism. Although an underlying 
feature in nationalism is to promote a sense social cohesion, solidarity, kinship, and 
togetherness, this collectiveness can paradoxically be very exclusive. Through 
nationalism, a collective as a distinct interest group is created that seeks not only to 
better life for the sake of the group but for the sake of the nationalism itself as well. 
Even if we are aware that there can be and are many different nationalisms that try 
to impose their view of monism to the public, the acknowledgement of this is not to 
utter a tautology because the model presented in this thesis illustrates how one sort 
of nationalism seeks to exclude all other variants, otherwise there would not be a 
need for it to exist. The model allows us to critically examine what it is that the 
nationalism under scrutiny advocates and how acceptable its monism truly is. It 
allows us to ask just how does the monism/nationalism portrayed take into account 
its restrictiveness and examine why it is just this sort of monism/nationalism that is 
the most useful and best. The conceptual analysis of the dimensions helps us in 
delving deeper into the essence of the nationalism and identify as well as examine 
the central ingredients in it. This way nationalisms can be compared and studied 
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how one can be more pluralistic than another. This is also why it is so important to 
look at not only what are the ideas and concepts presented but also where they stem 






This thesis’ purpose was to show what nationalism is and what makes it such a 
varied phenomenon it is. This was done by providing a new holistic framework to 
the study of nationalism. This conceptual approach for viewing and analysing 
nationalism allows the differentiating of the concept of nationalism from the 
phenomenon. This way the concept of nationalism can be treated neutrally while the 
critical energy can be projected to the different manifestations of the phenomenon 
and not to its process of creation. This process was identified as the attempt to form 
a distinct political collective using nationalist argumentation. How this process 
works was argued to be three-dimensional, to which this framework argued here is 
based on. The separation of the concept and phenomenon allowed the use of concept 
analysis to scrutinise and identify the underlying features of nationalism. 
Through this process, three different dimensions with their respective but separate 
ideas, concepts and notions, were found. By taking all the dimensions into account, 
a much more critical and thus analytical stance can be taken when studying the 
socially constructed phenomenon of nationalism itself. All of the three dimensions 
identified were found to be irremovable from the phenomenon itself and thus 
required for the most complete and holistic analysis possible. If even one were to be 
removed, it would change the phenomenon in such a way that it would not be 
possible to talk about nationalism as such anymore. 
The two dimensions of psychological and political were found to be the sources of 
ideas for nationalism. They offer projections of what kind of a collective we are 
dealing with and what is its appearance, in addition to giving meaning to why the 
collective in question should strive do something with itself. The psychological 
dimension is the basis for concepts such as identity, ethnicity and culture and while 
they are important in the process of producing nationalism, they are not enough by 
themselves. The political dimension is required to offer notions such as self-
determination and sovereignty to the imagined community of the psychological 
dimension. The respective ideas from the two idea-dimensions are concretised in 
the discursive dimension where the ultimate choice is made of what kind of 
nationalism is presented. 
73 
 
In the centre of nationalism are the admirable notions of social togetherness, loyalty, 
solidarity and togetherness. It is thus unfortunate that the process of producing 
nationalism always includes the establishment of hierarchical divisions and 
exclusionary boundaries. This way nationalism moves away from the realm of 
pluralism, with its infinite amount of ideas to pursue, and into the realm of monism 
where a single normative policy is created and advocated. We must thus always ask 
every manifestation of nationalism just how pluralistic is its monism, so that we 
would be able to see how exclusive a view of being human they are claiming as it can 
lead to wanton claims of racism and xenophobia. 
Because it is such a pervasive phenomenon, nationalism should not be shied away 
from. It cannot be allowed to be appropriated just by those who wish to use it as 
instruments of division, racism, hate and xenophobia as there is much more to 
nationalism than that. Like in the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt “the only thing 
to fear is fear itself”. For us not to end like the nationalists who fear the unknown, 
we must stop living in the dark and the framework this thesis provides aids in just 
that: making that which was once unknown and thus feared more approachable and 
thus less intimidating. There must be alternatives that emphasise the ability of the 
state to provide well-being to all of its citizens, residents and inhabitants and not 
just along some arbitrary ethnic lines, and the framework presented in this thesis 
aids in that. The key lies in talking about issues in their right or correct terms and 
once this is resolved and clarified we can move on to critically examine them and 
this is exactly how the framework presented helps us to do this. 
Due to nationalism’s overarching capabilities, every political movement or party 
which wants to be taken seriously should have their own view of and on nationalism 
and advocate it. Nationalism is such a ubiquitous phenomenon that it cannot be 
feared or disregarded and thus be given complete access and ownership to those 
who wish to use it through negative anti-humanist motions and antiques. 
Nationalism is also not going to go away because as long as there are states that have 
inhabitants there will be collectives that can be portrayed as nations as well; nations 
that seek answers to political questions regarding their lives and outlooks of their 
future, to which political parties must give answers to. As nationalism will continue 
to affect us for a long time still, it is instrumental to keep studying it and the sounder 
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the theories, frameworks and tools we can temper, the more enlightening 
discoveries we can make. 
Fortunately, much has been done but still more is yet to be done, maybe infinitely 
so. As the circumference of the beam of light grows with every discovery so does the 
circumference of the surrounding darkness with it. Still, as nationalism is not going 
to go away by turning a blind eye to it, but quite the opposite, we need to look it even 
more deeply and with eyes wide open so that we can understand its manipulative 
capabilities in more depth and find ways to counter the inhumane narratives of 
ethno-nationalist and perhaps move towards a narrative of humanity as a nation. 
This thesis also illustrated how nationalism possesses incredible skills of survival 
and adaptability. It has not only endured the turmoil of the last quarter of a 
millennium but also shown quite unfathomable tenacity through constant trial and 
error and also how it succeeds time after time to impose its will upon humankind, 
of which it has taken such a hold that seems all but inescapable. With its projections 
of togetherness and social solidarity in people after they have entered into the social 
contract, nationalism provides an admirable point which we can hardly criticise. 
What we need to keep in mind, however, is that the only common denominator we 
have is our humanity. Outside of that and after that everything is up for grabs, and 
this grabbing we can now analyse in a three- dimensional way. This thesis 
encourages new critical study and examination of nationalism via the presented 
framework to further the critical, holistic approach and endeavour presented here 
as well as in the discovery of new uses for already established concepts and the 
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